Separation of Powers: A Case Study of Pakistan (1947 to Present)

Abstract

Since its establishment in 1947, Pakistan has not been able to institutionalize the doctrine of separation of powers, a basic building block of constitutional democracies that seeks to avoid concentration of power and ensure civil liberties. Successive constitutions have formally defined the powers of the executive, legislature, and judiciary, but the application of this doctrine has eluded the nation. Remote from being independent pillars of state, these institutions have usually been subjected to executive excesses, military takeovers, and bureaucratic centralization. The research work analyses critically how the principle of separation of powers has developed in Pakistan from the period of independence up to the contemporary era. It analyses how constitutional writings, judicial attitudes, and political events have constructed and sometimes misrepresented the equilibrium between state institutions. Special focus is given to constitutional starting points, such as the Objectives Resolution (1949), the Constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973, and the judiciary's reactions to military coup. The post-2007 judicial movement is also examined and its effects on institutional autonomy. Through an examination of historical trends, case law, and judicial precedent, the research attempts to discern if Pakistan has progressed towards effective separation of powers or if institutional imbalance has taken deeper roots. Finally, the paper asserts that without structural change and cultural transformation towards constitutionalism, the vision of separation of powers will remain more declarative than functional.