Regional Arms Control in a Nuclearized Neighborhood: A Defensive Realist Analysis of Prospects and Barriers between Pakistan and Iran

Abstract

One of the most persistent issues in world security is regional arms control in the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are mostly aimed at India, but they have strategic ramifications that go west, affecting Iran's perceptions of security and the dynamics of regional deterrence. This paper examines the opportunities and obstacles for arms control cooperation between Pakistan and Iran in a nuclearized area using Defensive Realism as the main analytical framework. Both states' cautious nuclear behavior within anarchic regional systems can be understood through the interpretative lens of defensive realism, which emphasizes survival, security maximization, and avoiding over expansion. Based on qualitative secondary analysis, the study concludes that institutional deficiencies, external alignments, and structural asymmetries impede cooperation, but there are still few opportunities for communication and confidence building. The article makes the case that both states pursue nuclear restraint through pragmatic, security driven rationality rather than altruism by basing the discussion on Defensive Realist logic.