The Israel-Gaza, Iran and Afghanistan Crises: How UN Mechanisms Fail/Succeed in Managing Conflicts Involving Great Powers: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

The United Nations was established as the principal multilateral institution for the maintenance of international peace and security; yet its conflict management mechanisms have demonstrated persistent and systemic limitations when the strategic interests of permanent Security Council members are at stake. This study undertakes a comparative analysis of three contemporary conflict cases Israel-Gaza, Iran and Afghanistan to examine the conditions under which UN mechanisms succeed or fail in environments shaped by great-power competition. Employing a qualitative research design with a doctrinal approach and relying exclusively on secondary sources, the research traces how veto politics, selective multilateralism and great-power rivalry have paralysed Security Council action, undermined multilateral agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and constrained UN engagement in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The study finds that the structural architecture of the Security Council, particularly the veto mechanism, systematically privileges the geopolitical interests of permanent members over the collective security mandate of the institution. By identifying common patterns across three distinct conflict contexts, the research contributes to theoretical debates on institutional effectiveness and provides a scholarly basis for ongoing discussions regarding UN reform.