Constitutional Promise to Governance Practice: Implementation Gaps in Council of Common Interests Decisions after the 18th Amendment in Pakistan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v4i1.1739Keywords:
Council of Common Interests, 18th Amendment, Cooperative Federalism, Implementation Gaps, Policy Implementation, Pakistan Governance, Post-Conflict Rehabilitation.Abstract
This study examines the implementation gaps and governance challenges associated with the Council of Common Interests (CCI) in Pakistan following the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010). The amendment aimed to institutionalize cooperative federalism by devolving authority to provinces and strengthening intergovernmental coordination mechanisms. Despite constitutional reforms, persistent delays in convening meetings, weak enforcement mechanisms, political contestation, and fiscal disputes under National Finance Commission (NFC) arrangements have constrained execution of CCI decisions. Drawing upon primary sources, including the Constitution of Pakistan, CCI annual reports (2011–2024), parliamentary debates, Cabinet Division reports, and provincial development data, the study provides a province-wise analysis of implementation challenges across Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan. Special attention is given to post-conflict rehabilitation demands in KP, inter-provincial resource disputes, urban infrastructure challenges in Sindh, and fiscal allocation issues under the NFC Award. The findings indicate that institutional reforms alone have not ensured compliance, as political bargaining, fiscal asymmetries, and capacity deficits continue to shape implementation outcomes. The study concludes that enforcing constitutional timelines, aligning fiscal arrangements with devolved responsibilities, improving administrative capacity, and institutionalizing monitoring mechanisms are essential for realizing the promise of cooperative federal governance in Pakistan.
