Power Politics and Legal Norms: How Great Powers Shape International Law Enforcement

Authors

  • Aman Ullah Higher School of Economics. Moscow Russia. Corresponding Author: amanu7114@gmail.com
  • Aftab Ahmed Higher School of Economics, HSE Moscow. aftabahmedu4@gmail.com

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v4i1.1656

Abstract

The international legal order embodies a fundamental tension between the normative principle of sovereign equality and the practical dominance of power politics exercised by great powers. This paper examines how hegemonic states shape, interpret, and selectively enforce international law to advance their strategic interests while evading accountability. Drawing on realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist theoretical frameworks, it analyzes the interplay between material power and legal norms, highlighting mechanisms such as the UN Security Council's veto power, procedural dominance (penholding and double veto), unilateral sanctions, and economic statecraft. Through case studies including the 2003 Iraq invasion, China's rejection of the 2016 South China Sea arbitral ruling, Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) under Executive Order 14203 the analysis reveals patterns of selective compliance, exceptionalism, and the weaponization of legal tools (lawfare). The paper further explores counter-hegemonic responses, including Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), which challenge Western-centric hierarchies and advocate for democratized legal discourse. Ultimately, while international law exhibits resilience through formal consent-based sources and normative stickiness, its enforcement remains contingent on great power consent and capabilities, perpetuating a hierarchical global order that undermines universal rule-of-law aspirations.

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Published

12-02-2026

How to Cite

Aman Ullah, & Aftab Ahmed. (2026). Power Politics and Legal Norms: How Great Powers Shape International Law Enforcement. Social Science Review Archives, 4(1), 1393–1403. https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v4i1.1656