The Twenty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment and the Erosion of Judicial Independence in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis

Abstract

Judicial independence is the bedrock of Pakistan’s constitutional democracy, safeguarding the rule of law through an impartial judiciary. The Twenty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2024, has fundamentally transformed the judicial appointment process by granting Parliament and the Executive decisive influence over the selection of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the composition of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan. This paper critically argues that the Amendment fails to strike a legitimate balance between accountability and independence, instead threatening to subordinate the judiciary to political control. Through analytical and comparative lenses, it explores Pakistan’s history of judicial reforms, evaluates the corrosive implications of the amendments for the separation of powers, and contrasts them with appointment systems in other common-law jurisdictions. The paper concludes that the 26th Amendment risks profound politicization, endangering the constitutional balance of power and undermining the very fabric of judicial independence. This paper employs a qualitative doctrinal method supported by comparative constitutional analysis.