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**Border and Control: War and Social Transformation at Pak-Afghan Borderland**

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*DOI: <https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v3i1.450>*

**Abstract:**

This paper extends the debate about the post-colonial state relationship to Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas and communities living in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. It details the existing structures of power that have evolved on war footing over four decades, since 1979. It grounds the debate of changing social order, by introducing new archival written material and conducting two years of fieldwork in Waziristan. The Paper is divided into three sections. The first part investigates the power structure, since the post-colonial state exploited the economic resources, in the form of border trade that was rooted in colonial experiences of the border. The next section explains the evolution of the war economy in the region and its contradictions. The last part emphasizes on war on terror as war over the human bodies and exploitation of economic and political resources.

**Key Words:** Postcolonial statecraft, Social Order, Borderland, ‘War on Terror’(WOT),

**Introduction:**

The complex situation in Waziristan, like in other parts of ex-Fata<sup>i</sup>, oscillating around the ongoing ‘WOT’, as a neo-imperial war, that cause death, destruction, and dispossession of local community of land, trade, and market(s). Commentators, who are praising United States (US) and its allies for wagging War on Terrorism (WOT), claim newness in the war (Shah 2007, Ahmed 2013, Dexter 2008). But, in WOT too, like in other imperial wars, colonialism reincarnated and regenerated, to serve the interests of neo-imperial power[s] (Kanji, 2021). Since 1979, US, as a leading imperial power through regional states, controls people’s economic and political resources on the pretext of human liberation, during the era of Cold War and in the current conjuncture after 9/11. In Pakistan’s specific case, the militarised state apparatus justifies war in tribal areas to gain geostrategic interests and to extract the economic and political resources. Pakistan continued the colonial legacy of appropriation and expropriation while exploiting people’s economic and political resources. This being the first argument of this paper, here by economic resources, I mean both border trade and presence of earth deposits available in ex-Fata. By exploitation of political resources, here it means that colonial and post-colonial state introduced politics of patronage among the tribesmen-selective group of local maliks were nominated to control the political and economic landscape of ‘tribal’ areas. The second argument extends details about the war infrastructures that have been utilized since 1979 in tribal belt. Such arrangements are both the product of Pakistani state’s war policies in the areas and exploitation of historical trading routes and trade across the border. A class of transporters became involved in channelizing war ammunition and religious *Mullah*<sup>ii</sup> indulged in the propagation of ‘jihad’, who got state’s patronage for the service. The neo-imperial wars in the border do not make only people killable bodies but also provide a space for economic and political exploitation of the border community. Death, humiliation, collective punishment,

torture, and mutilated body become norms of the day (Khan, Jan and Ashraf 2023). The perpetuity of violence during the four decades or in other words, during the two wars i.e., Afghan Jihad (Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan) and War on Terror after 9/11 affected the people on both sides of Durand Line<sup>iii</sup>. The generations who grew up during these wars have seen displacement, violence, along with dispossession of landed property and market. The exploitation of economic resources and expropriation of local community's trade, land and markets in war's years led to the new politico-economic order.

### Literature Review:

Scholarship, that deals with ex-Fata, focuses the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the border areas. Subject matters reinforce state's failure and the presence of warlike tribes. For instance, in "*The Al-Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas*", Imtiaz Gul tells us about the geopolitical role of the Taliban, talks about geostrategic position of Tribal area (Gul, 2010). Another book is written with same theme, "*FATA- A Most Dangerous place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.*" by Shuja Nawaz (Nawaz S. , 2009). "*Afghanistan and Pakistan: conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity*" by Muhammad Raiz, deals with the development in Afghanistan since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the rise of 'militancy' in Pakistan's tribal region, and its antecedents and linkages with Afghan 'jihad'. (Raiz, 2011). *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (Rashid 2001), and *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, (Rashid, 2009), are books by Ahmad Rashid, is about the structural organization of the Taliban and its link with the *Al Qaeda*. A book, on Pakistan counter insurgency campaigns, has been written by Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, (Fair & Jones, 2010). Existed written knowledge about the frontier region that was produced by colonial master has been expanded by those who have been attached with the official narrative. We would look here into anthropological works about Pashtun society in this direction, which can be classified into two types. On the one hand, work which had been done by those who uphold the official narrative in their understanding of Pashtun social structure. This type of written materials is completed under the pen of the Pakistani state officials. The second type of work is done by those who are independent researchers, who lived and stayed among the tribesmen of northern belt of Pashtun land in Pakistan. Akbar S. Ahmed, who was a government servant in Waziristan and Mohmand districts, wrote anthropological work about socio-political and socio-economic structure. His interaction with Mohmand tribes in 'tribal and settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former North West Frontier Province), resulted in the conceptualization of Pashtun social structure through his "*Ideal Type Model*. He divided the Pashtun society into two categories, Tribal Areas Muhmand (TAM) and Settled Area Muhmand (STM). The former labelled as *Nang* (honour) society, while the later has termed as *Qalang* (taxpaying) society (Ahmed A. S., 1980, p. 196). According to him, Waziristan, being part of tribal areas, is a *Nang* society. But he considers that *Nang* society in Waziristan is in crisis. The ideal behaviors of *Nang* society could not be fully found among the tribesmen of the areas. The reason for this state of affairs, according to him, is the emergence of a charismatic personality of *Mullah Noor Muhammad* in the political sphere of South Waziristan, which became possible due to his socio-religious struggle and psychological power (Ahmed A. S., 1983) . According to some critics, the "*ideal type model*" of social structure and culture is in the process of transformation, due to the inflow of huge amounts of remittances from abroad, especially from the Gulf States (Addelton, 1992), which Ahmed has also partially realized in his more recent article, *The Arab connection: Emergent models of social structure among Pakistani tribesmen* (Ahmed A. S., 2007). Sana Haroon in her book *Frontier of Faith, A History of Religious Mobilization in the Pukhtun Tribal Areas 1890-1950*, looks into the structure of patronage politics and social authority structure among Tribesmen (Haroon, 2011). But Haroon

too only tells us about the pre-partition era to trace the history of religious mobilization in Tribal areas. These accounts don't historicise the complexity of Pakistan's relation with border landers-across and within the Durand Line (1893). Post-Colonial, like colonial state, appropriated trade commodities and expropriated the mobile communities through its legal and administrative orders, that resulted both physical and social mobilities among the people of borderland.

### **Methodology:**

The extended case study research method (Burawoy, 1998) is applied to reconstruct theory of social [trans]formation through the extended observation of social forces in small places. "This method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the "micro" to the "macro" and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory" (Burawoy, 1998, p. 5). This paper theorized transformation at the level of North Waziristan tribal district (NWTD), by asking the question that how state, since its encounter with the borderland, appropriates the economic and Political resources, first, by providing ground for its nominees through bringing special laws (FCRs) and then by waging war(s) on the pretext of liberation and security in tribal areas. The paper is based on two years fieldwork in Waziristan and archival data collected for my PhD project. Data collection was completed through two qualitative research techniques: archival research and ethnographic methods. The field data is substantiated with archival official reports and state policies papers to further a thematic analysis of the question under investigation in this paper.

### **Discussion:**

#### **Colonialism and Control**

Colonialism is often understood, as it is the appropriation of raw materials from the periphery to the centre (Césaire, 2022). In the case of India, Aditya Mukherjee notes, "at the heart of colonialism lay surplus capital appropriation from the colony to the metropolis" (Mukherjee, 2010, p. 74). She argues further, as Lanzillo explains, "this appropriation was not rooted only in the fact that colonies were suppliers of raw materials and consumers of finished goods from the metropolis, but also in the transfer of labour, commodities, and knowledge" (Lanzillo, 2022). In the case of then Northwest border areas of India (now Pakistan-Afghanistan border region), colonial state exploited people's trade, trade routes and seasonal mobility. The policy of 'Tribal Control and Defence' was extended to tribal areas and the strategy of blockade was introduced on 'traditional' routes of transportation.<sup>iv</sup> A British official assert on policy of blockade in the following lines:

In spite of difficulties of our trans-border commitments and to the fact that we no longer deal with the Waziristan tribes at arm's length, I believe that the application of the blockade still remains a potent weapon and it can be used without creating international complications with Afghanistan or running our own fellow subjects. (Miss.Eur.D.681/22, 1924-25)

Appropriation of trade commodities and expropriation of mobile communities, through colonial legality and enactment of boundaries, resulted in controlled mobilities-both social and physical. For instance, the Frontier Crime Regulation Act (FCR) of 1901, carried indirect rule, introduced selective social mobility among the tribesmen. Political agent administered the areas through his nominated leadership (Maliks), from each tribe.<sup>v</sup> Political agent distributed tribal allowances and subsidies among the tribesmen through hands those selected few to sustained control over the masses<sup>vi</sup> (Nichols 2013).

In considering the problem of tribal control British India found it necessary to divide tribal subsidies into two aspects. There was the normal situation in which such measure of control as was maintained over the tribe had exercised by the political authorities without the use of force, by political methods, or with the support only of the civil armed forces. Again,

there was the abnormal situation when an emergency had arisen to cope with which these instruments were no longer adequate, and recourse must be had to the armed forces of the Crown. The first instrument of tribal control was the system of subsidies or tribal allowances (Diss.Eur.681/24, 1931, p. 10).

Custom Act(s) and performing of boundary system- Durand Line (1893) and other settled and 'tribal' areas boundaries- permitted few and restricted many, at various check points over the trade and seasonal mobility routes. These routes were controlled and protected by tribesman known as *Khassadars*<sup>vii</sup>, recruited from tribes of Maliks.

### **Changing Social Order in Post-Colonial Society:**

Patronage-client relationship reemerged when Pakistan retained indirect rule on the border. Postcolonial state gave allowances and allotted land to maliks for their services of controlling resistance among the tribesmen<sup>viii</sup> (Cabinet Division, 1957) These nominated few were then active in politics of tribal areas; they remained loyal with Pakistan. Agreement(s) was signed between Maliks, and state of Pakistan and tribal areas became formal part of Pakistan. Gazdar identifies two trends that changed the economic landscape in tribal areas during 1970s; first state's developmental schemes, and second was the emigration to the Middle East (Gazdar, 2014). When installation of factories, new metalled roads, and migrant back home remittances ended up in socio-economic transformation (Cabinet Division, 1974), the social authority of political Malik declined, and *Mullah* came in competition with Malik, to get share in societal power. State did not give any monetary funds to its religious client<sup>ix</sup>, but he was supported by Gulf migrants and local transporters from the areas. Gazdar (2014) and Addleton (1992) among others, detail about financial support to *Mullah* by Gulf migrants from Waziristan. Ahmed writes on state's developmental campaign and emerging social order in tribal area, during Prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime (Ahmed 1977). However, they do not look at the state's appropriation of trade and trade routes, and the resulting social order. Neither support from the local trading community to *Mullah* nor the appropriation of the border trade by the state functionaries remains the subject of discussion. In following paragraphs, the state appropriation of the trading community will be discussed whereas the support to religious mullah from the transporters would be detailed in next section of the paper. Over the time, state's control mechanism on the border introduced social mobilities in the trading community and selective permission were given to goods and commodities by introducing borders control laws. Pakistan introduced and extended to tribal areas the custom law (Cabinet Division, 1969). The route between Peshawar and Islamabad were also nationalized in September 1970 on the insistence of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then, Northwest Frontier Province) government. Check posts near Durand line and borders between settled and tribal districts were materialised.<sup>x</sup> Permit system was introduced for transporters to trade across the border. It was decided that the permits of private transporters expired would not be renewed thus phasing out private transport (Cabinet Division, 1972). Border patrols were installed to monitor the movement of the people. This measure has seriously affected the livelihood of transporters from the tribal Areas. Extending the legal order through permit system to control the border trade as the law says (Cabinet Division, 1973). The permit system had squeezed the number of traders and continued the same colonial order of patronizing the few. Furthermore, the state put forward the narrative of smuggling and the reification of border by state officials, who always overemphasise the smuggling. "Such a perspective is based on a series of dichotomies such as law/outlaw, legal/illegal, or trade/smuggling. It externalises social forces, processes, and actors that do not fit in the state narrative" (Keshavarz & Khosravi, 2022, p. 2). Such social forces are the product of interaction between trading community and state state's functionaries at the border over the time. In our context, social forces -state officials including border patrol, Frontier Core (FC), custom officials, and transporters- at the border manipulated the border laws to gain more

from the border trade. Specific class of transporter was emerged at the border who were working in harmony with border authority by paying extra, to escape the legal protocol. Anti-smuggling staffs were in joint venture with political administration and with border FC to exploit the trade goods and charge extra from the border traders. As a result, social relations have been established between the border patrol and custom officials, and the border traders that were in symbiotic relations. In this kind of symbiosis, one escapes the legal protocol and other gets the economic benefits. The following document depicts the docile relationship between the state functionaries and transporters.

The staff of the anti-smuggling agencies should not be allowed to stay at one station for long periods. They should be kept under constant transfer so that they do not mix up with the locals. The anti-smuggling should be done by more than one agency in a particular area. The staff of the Political Agents should be transferable outside the agency ... It is alleged that civil officers in this area work in harmony with the smugglers thus giving them protection at the time of their apprehension by the anti-smuggling agencies. This situation needs to be rectified urgently (Cabinet Division, 1973).

The legal cover of controlling the border trade and allowing only those items of trade permitted by state authorities, and the mingling of state personnel with the traders at the border, resulted in new social order. The structures of power introduced at the borderland in the decades following the independence of Pakistan were later utilized for the requirement of Afghan mujahedeen and in channelizing aids to Afghanistan after 1979. The importance of border landers, especially of the transporters became more prominent after Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. When local forces played a key role in transporting war ammunition to Afghan mujahedeen. War infrastructure was established in the Pak-Afghan border which will be discussed in detail in the following pages.

### **Borderland on War Footing:**

We are opening the discussion with a story of a 'Blackia' [the term *Blackia* is using in South Asian context for the person who is involved in 'illegal' trade and smuggling of 'illicit' goods across the national border (Chattha, 2022, p. 9)], who was jailed for four months on charge of weapon's transportation to Afghan Taliban, at Chaman border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2014, at the time of military operation *Zerb-e-Azab*. He, an old man in his sixties, was a truck driver from Waziristan. During Bhutto era, he worked as a transporter of food items on the route between Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then Northwest Frontier Province). He also worked as a truck driver in Abu Dhabi in the early 2000s. Recollections of his early days, as a driver, he says.

*Before Russian invasion of Afghanistan, there was no proper addas (Marketplaces) for the illegal goods at the border. They were managed through Agents who had close ties with the big businessmen and sarkar (the officials). There was difficulty in transporting these illegal goods, but it was perfectly organized. I had been part of smuggling of drug to Karachi for very long time. When we brought the loaded trucks to Karachi, there was house near Chairman of Karachi [Trade and Transport Chairman Karachi] where trucks were unloaded, and the drugs were then carried through local transport and would send through seaport. We were directed to bring at least two loaded trucks of drugs each month so the Behri Jahaz (ship) would be arranged monthly. I transported a lot of war ammunition and weapons to Quetta and Afghanistan. I was arrested only once and it was during military operation *Zarb-e-Azab*, which displaced people from North Waziristan as IDPs (internally displaced persons). I did carry this war ammunition to Afghanistan not only via Bannu-North Waziristan route but also via Quetta-Chaman route. Before Afghan war, transport holders from Waziristan were least attractive to the business of drug and guns, except the transporters from Khyber Agency (Now 'Tribal' district) that were involved in gun trade. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan transporters from Waziristan participated in the*

*drug and gun trade because it was profitable and with legal impunity, when Afghan Mujahedeen were resisting Russian” (T, 2018).*

This story unfolds against the backdrop of war that how people or mainly the traders adopted or/and adapted the new socio-political order and earn the living. In the context of the Cold war between the USSR and the US, the Afghan *Mujahedeen's* financial resources heavily-though not solely- relied on drug trade and the permissive environment for drug trafficking led many people from the tribal region to engaged in drug trade. Moreover, the People of the tribal belt also started growing poppy crops in their small agriculture landholdings, as opium and heroin brought much higher profit as compared to regular seasonal crops (Rashid 2001). The available patronized trade routes were utilized by Afghan Mujahedeen to channelize the drug trade, in addition, small gun manufacturing industries also thrived exponentially during the period, particularly at Bara bazaar in Khyber Agency and Miranshah bazaar in North Waziristan. Waziristan was plagued by the smuggling of drugs and guns which was systematized during Afghan war of 1980 (PW3, 2020). This smuggling was actively promoted by Zia Ul Haq led US backed military regime. The transport regime flourished under the army-run National Logistic Cell (NLC) (Haq 1996). On asking from my interviewee, who was a transporter from Waziristan, how did they pass or cross the customs or police check-posts while transporting these illegal goods? He responds:

*There was no army check-post but of Custom and its para-military force. We know how and when to cross the posts because there was exact time of checking hours, and we were very careful about the timing. We, the transporters were not only in this illegal trade, but trucks belong to NLC (National Logistic Cell) also carried weapons from Karachi to Afghanistan and transport drugs from Afghanistan under the supervision of Pakistan intelligence Agencies and ISI who had strong links with leaders of Afghan Mujahideen (T2, 2018).*

Two events- Soviet Union invasion in 1979 and of NATO forces invade Afghanistan at the beginning of the 21st century after 9/11- have significantly affected the life of common people. The social fabric of society has been drastically changed. Both events have brought war economy, huge inflows of Afghan refugees (*Afghan Mahajereen*), training camps, arms depots, and a complex war infrastructure into the area in question. Tribal areas remained an important zone for the state to secure its so-called national interests and to complete national security project at the border since 1979.<sup>xi</sup> Pakistan decided to support Afghan Mujahedeen, who were opposing the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. A lot has been written about Western capitalist block, along with Arab world, provided financial support to Afghan *Mahjareen* and war ammunition to Afghan *Mujahedeen*. All such support and funds were channelized through Pakistan. *Gazdar* says that Pakistan adopted two strategies. “First, to support the new Jihad-based strategy, the state developed a new infrastructure of theological institutions across the country. Secondly, Pakistan security agencies made alliances with Islamic world militant groups, making them crucial allies in a national security strategy” (Gazdar, 2014, p. 180). Mariam Abou Zahab, Olivier Roy among others have provided details about the presence of *Deobandi Madrassas* (Islamic teaching center), supported by ‘Arab donors’ as recruitment centers for the locals of the area (Roys & Zahab, 2006). The transactions patterns of Arab’s funding and its impact on tribal region have not been fully accounted for. The patterns of labor migration and migrants’ remittances from Gulf state facilitated the funding procedures to the Afghan *Mujahedeen*. Labor migrants from the villages became the middleman, as it were, between the Arab donors, and their clients/agents/proxies/allies, the Afghan *Mujahedeen*.<sup>xii</sup> And in the process, these migrants became the main source of economic and political power at the village level. Their previous affiliations with *Mullah* became strengthened still further.

‘Illegal’ channels were adopted by migrants who left for Gulf States, same was the case with their back home remittances (Addelton, 1992). Money was mostly remitted with *Hawala*, *Hundi* or through hands of those migrants who belonged from the same village.<sup>xiii</sup> A *Hundi*-holder has his

shops in Miranshah, or, in Chowek-e-Yaadgar-Peshawar, and at the same time in Abu Dubai or other Gulf city and his network has been stretched to every major town of tribal areas (PW3, 2020). Due to lack of 'formal' banking system in most part of tribal areas, not only migrants, but all those businessmen and dealers of import and export from and to Afghanistan were attached in one or another way to 'informal' banking system. "All these big dealers and traders who had their business in the tribal areas of Miranshah almost used these 'illegal' channels to transact their money to big companies of the country to channelize products" (T3, 2018). In Miranshah, before *Zerb-e-Azab*, Taliban received most of the amount from the Arab states or from Karachi, through these channels. They even took the responsibility of protecting such all-Hundi shops that were in favour to remit them money in Miranshah" (PW3, 2020) The pendulum of state patronage oscillate between Malik and Mullah depends on the historical contingency. State policies became changed toward tribal areas so its approach to politics of patronage system. The Malik who enjoyed special status, lost much of his place to the religious Mullah and transport holder on account of the latter's growing importance in the context of Afghan Jihad-for it was in the name of religion that the support of the people was sought. Mullah and his pulpit were put to use for the recruitment of tribesmen in the Afghan-Mujahideen. Similarly, the transporters became the vehicles of transportation of arms and armed militants into Afghanistan on the one hand and provided the means of transportation of the "drug smuggling" from Afghanistan on the other hand. These drugs were then smuggled to Europe and America through Karachi Sea Port or through air via Lahore. (Haq 2022). Mullah and transporter became heroes among the common tribesmen who had cross-border political affiliation with Afghan Mujahideen and Pakistan Intelligence agency (ISI). 'Illicit' trade of drugs and gun had changed the social fabric of the society. Weapons culture was promoted and most of tribesmen got addicted to Hash and Heroin (Haq 1993).

### **'War on Terror' and Transformation**

After 9/11, as the Pakistan state purportedly changed its policy towards Afghanistan and joined the "WOT" as non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally of the US. Taliban or Afghan Mujahideen as an organization is a product of Pakistan state policies (Gannon, 2005). Army comes and makes peace deals with the Taliban and institutionalizes the later in tribal belt (Khattak, 2012). Much has been written about Talibanization and its religious ideological manifestation. However, what remains to be seen is that how the politics of patronage reinstated the relations between the new leadership of the jihadi organization and state in tribal belt and how they got authority systematically? This new leadership has made strategies to secure their interests in the society. People associated with the movement have quite material interests in joining the movement such as economic and political interests as well as. In other words, the individuals in the Taliban movement were as much motivated by socio-economic interests as by ideological motivations. They were rooted in the power relation and resources distribution. Taliban had their shares in the production of poppy crops, and weapon business. They got funds (extortion) from the local traders and poppy growers (Rashid, 2001). The latter were dependent on the former for protection of their fields and business. Owing to a myriad of economic activities, the licit/illicit trade emerged and/or grew exponentially during Cold War and War on terror, the old power structure and social relations have undergone considerable transformation. Field note shows, over struggle for political power and control of economic resources in Waziristan many Maliks became target of Taliban. A novel economic setup is established after Pakistani military operations<sup>xiv</sup>, that resulted in uneven development in the area. 'WOT', as a neo-imperial war, caused death, destruction, and displacement of people from their native land and sources of livelihood that were present in the form of border trade and local markets. During military operation, markets places were destroyed. For instances, old markets of *Miran Shah* and *Mir Ali* are demolished.<sup>xv</sup> One of my informers says "such act for the side of Pakistani armies is clear induction that the state wants to destroy our

organizational politics, as Miranshah market was such a place, where we [local community] came together and discuss local matter” (Pashteen 2019). After Operation *Zeb-e-Azab*, new physical developments, such as constructions of new markets and roads have been completed under the supervision of Pakistan army’s giant construction organization FWO (Frontier Work Organization). Contracts of all new projects along with the extraction of minerals resources were granted to selective contractors (PW5, 2016). FWO initiated two pilot projects of copper mining and processing in North Waziristan. Foreign companies are encouraged by Pakistan army to extract minerals.<sup>xvi</sup> Army’s control over the minerals became possible with the help of Maliks (Malik who sustained his political power, escape the trap of religious ‘militants’, and supported every move of Pakistani state since 1980), signed agreements vis-à-vis minerals extraction and share of each tribe in minerals royalty was determined (FWO, 2016). The local leaders and contractors now directly deal with army personals bypassing civil administration. Political administration in the form of political agent in the area came in direct conflict with military establishment over managing economic activities across the border and rehabilitation process after the said military operation. Recently, many those locals, who had been working under political agents as lower staff, have been killed by unidentified person.<sup>xvii</sup> (E, 2017).

## Conclusion

The structures of power and social order, emerged in the early decades of Pakistan’s inception in 1947, later utilized in the war years since 1979 in tribal areas for channelizing war ammunition across the border. Commentaries on wars, in Cold War context or in the present context of ‘War on Terrorism’ look for newness in the wars and forward hopes for people’s liberation and security. The findings of this paper, I have shown in the above sections, make it clear that wars deepen the political and economic interests of dominated social order in the context of tribal areas of Pakistan. People’s perspective shows that on the pretext of security and development Pakistani state launched military operations that caused death, displacement, destructions, and exploitation of the political and economic resources.

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## End Notes

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<sup>i</sup> FATA (Federally administered Tribal Areas). In FATA There were seven Agencies (Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber, Orakzai Agency, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan.) and Six Frontier Regions (FR). Agency was a colonial setup of administration that was headed by a political agent through special laws called Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR), 1901. With passing of 25th amendment in constitution of Pakistan, ‘Tribal Agency’ name has been changed with ‘Tribal’ District, and Fata has been mainstreamed with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan (Ishfaq, 2023).

<sup>ii</sup> The most common application of the title mullah is to religious leaders, teachers in religious schools, those versed in Sharia Law. leaders of prayer in the mosques (imams), or reciters of the Qur’ān (*qurrā*). In 1970s, Islamic religious class was promoting Islamic ideology of Pakistani state and remained active in the political landscape of tribal areas.

<sup>iii</sup> Durand Line: a border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This line was drawn in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan to fix their areas of influence and manage trade during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman- an Afghan King (Shams, 2017).

<sup>iv</sup> Historically, tribesmen were related with pastoral economy. They were looking for Indian market(s) to sell out their cattle, goods, timber, and crude iron. Official documents indicates that, ‘the tribesmen imported iron, where formerly they used to smelt it themselves. For cloth, grain, salt, and leather they had always depended on the markets of Tank and Bannu, and they had had many new wants, such as Kerosine oil, matches cigarettes, tea, etc.’ (Miss.Eur.D.681/22, 1924-25)

<sup>v</sup> Under FCR law, Political Agent executed his power through his nominated Maliks from each tribe. He was the sole authority in every Agency (Nichols, 2013).

<sup>vi</sup> The total sum paid annually by the Government of India in subsidies to the frontier tribes, including the subventions granted to individual Rulers, such as the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawabs of Dir and Amb, was Rs. 886 lakhs. (Diss.Eur.681/24, 1931)

<sup>vii</sup> The Afghan Government has from old time had irregular formations in its employ known a *khassadars*. The name was apparently first adopted on the Indian side of the Durand Line in 1906 when some Mullagori tribesmen and Shilmanis were employed as khassadars in the Khyber Agency for the protection of work on the Shilman railway. These *khassadars* were paid a basic wage of Rs. 10 per mensem. In 1908, 200 *Khassadars* on a basic wage of Rs. 11 per mensem were engaged in the Malakand Agency for the protection of cooli camps on the Swat River Canal, which was then under construction. (Miss.Eur.D.681/22, 1924-25, p. 13)

<sup>viii</sup> In the partition plan of 1947, Pashtun nationalist leadership demanded for an independent state for Pashtun of tribal Areas and NWFP. Activities for an independent Pashtun state were started in its practical form in Waziristan and Khyber by two prominent leaders: *Haji Mir Zali Khan*, popularly known as *Faqir of Ippi* and *Malik Muhammad Wali Khan* respectively. Faqir, who was a spiritual leader, resisted the colonial encroachment of the Pashtun land. He sent a letter to the prominent Tribal leaders and mullahs the areas that “Tribal Unity is most important then the Unity of the Muslim. (Haroon, 2011, p. 17).

<sup>ix</sup> *Mullah* propagated ‘Islamic ideological foundation of Pakistan’, through Friday sermons in opposition to Pashtunistan activities in Tribal areas. (Cabinet Division, 1976)

<sup>x</sup> Government may, at any place along the boundary line between the Province and an acceding State and at such distance within such line as it deem expedient, or at any place in the Province that it may deem proper establish searching posts at which any parson, vessel, vehicle or any other type of transport or any type of package or container in transit, may be stopped and searched for arcs, ammuniton and military stores by any officer empowered by Government in this behalf by name or in virtue of his office. (Cabinet Division, 1972)

<sup>xi</sup> On its North-West Pakistan has 2,430 kilometers border with Afghanistan known as Durand Line, Drawn by British India with Afghanistan. Successive Afghan governments negate the validity of such border after partition of India. Pakistan on the other hand continuously proves itself as the true successor of British in the Northern part of India. On coming of Soviet Union in Afghanistan Pakistan was afraid of Russian expansion toward its territories (Sahak, 2011).

<sup>xii</sup> See, Robert Nichols *History of Pashtun Migration 1775-2006*, on Pashtun’s mobility into different parts of the subcontinent before the Partition and about the recent migration, as labor migrants to Gulf. He also

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sheds light on religious orientation of the Pashtun in their day-to-day life and the impact of Arabization in Pakistan generally and Pashtun areas particularly (Nichols 2008).

<sup>xiii</sup> According to Gilani, 85.5% of the Gulf workers all over the country had used the formal banking system while remitting cash back home. If those workers who belonged from NWFP (now KPK) exclude from the above proportion of migrants who used bank, then the new percentage is 93.3%. So, it shows that migrants from the region of NWFP were mostly attached with informal channels. The reason Gilani gives, that it is due to proximity of the province to the Tribal areas, where the market of foreign exchange and smuggled foreign goods are well developed. Furthermore, he says that legal restrictions vis-à-vis smuggled foreign goods are relaxed in tribal areas (Gilani & Addelton, 1985).

<sup>xiv</sup> Pakistani forces have conducted at least seven major military operations, along with numerous smaller operations, since 2001: Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2002), Operation Al Mizan (2002–2006), Operation Zalzalā (2008), Operations Sher Dil, Rah-e-Haq, and Rah-e-Rast (2007–2009), Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009–2010) and Operation Zarb-e-Azab (2014). (Khan Z. A., 2016).

<sup>xv</sup> Both the markets were flourished During Afghan War and after 9/11, security agencies consider these markets as the hub of ‘terrorist’. (T2, 2018)

<sup>xvi</sup> From my filed notes it is evident that Chinese mining extracting companies are working on mining sites in North Waziristan.

<sup>xvii</sup> Field notes shows that Political *Muharrar*, Hamidullah was killed in North Waziristan.