

The Quest for Political Legitimacy in Zia's Era: An Analysis**Muhammad Anwar**PhD Scholar, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Email: manwar@hist.qau.edu.pk**Abstract:**

This research paper analyses the question of political legitimacy in Zia's era. In democratic countries the question of political legitimacy is lied in the will of the people. In Pakistan generally and Zia's regime specifically the will of the masses is jeopardized. To manifest, Zia imprisoned the then popular leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and then gave him capital punishment. The judicial murder of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto neither dismantled his popularity nor conferred Zia with political legitimacy. Therefore, Zia took the support of Islam to Islamize the state and society for his political legitimacy. Moreover, he conducted the pseudo-democratic elections on non-party basis to patronize the apolitical and religious political class. In this regard, he Islamized the state, society, educational system, media, economy, and legal system for acquiring legitimacy. In this whole process of gaining legitimacy, he had controlled the apex courts to avoid any kind of legal decision to question his legitimacy.

Key Words: Power, Islamization, Legitimacy, Zia**Introduction:**

In postcolonial states like Pakistan the dictators can be seen time and again in the power corridors because the democratic norms are not institutionalized in spirit at state and society level. The dictators acquire power by imposing martial law and suspending the constitution. This strict martial couldn't work for longer time and the regime is followed by civilianization process for power legitimacy. Therefore, every military regime in Pakistan is following the same patterns of strict martial law regulation, civilianization, and routinization (Khan, 2016) with exception to Yahya Khan's regime. In all other three Martial Laws, the public pressure has forced the military regimes to hold elections (Waseem and Hayat, 1997, p. 726). In all these stages of the dictatorial regimes the state of exception is being seen manifested (Agamben, 2005, and Schmitt, 1921). These stages equally follow the politics of power legitimacy and pose challenges to their political legitimacy. To summarize, Zia's era has legitimized his power legitimacy through religion (Jaffrelot, 2018, 173), politics, and international support. The challenge posed to the sustainability of his regime can be seen in the context of politics of resistance by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). So, the power legitimacy and challenges to Zia's legitimacy go side by side.

Literature Review:

Generally, there are multiple works written about the Zia's era. Most of these works revolves around two aspects i.e., Islamization and Afghan policy of Zia's regime. Patently, it is true that Zia's regime is incomplete without Islamization and his Afghan policy. Still, there can be many aspects which needs to be covered like the quest of political legitimacy by Zia. There are multiple scholarships which discuss the politics of legitimacy in Zia's era but with primary focus on another area like the institutionalization of non-representative institutions and derailment of the democratic structure.

The *Politics of Common Sense: State, Society and Culture in Pakistan* by Aasim Sajjad Akhtar is one of the good sources which has described Zia's era from societal point of view. The *Politics of Common sense* brings the theoretical debate of Gramscian model of common sense which appears natural to the masses to be challenged. He discusses the rise of the intermediate classes in Zia's regime and its subsequent adjustment in the power corridors. He focuses on the strategic patronage of the intermediate and middle class, integrating them into the political power structure. In return for their incentives, this intermediate class conferred legitimacy upon Zia's dictatorial regime.

The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan by Saadia Toor is another extensive book on the Zia's regime. It emphasizes the rise of orthodox Islamic narratives and suppression of the secular political identity in Pakistan. She challenges the notion that the rise of Islamization is the result of organic cultural process. Contrast to it, she argues that the instrumentalization of Islam has been cultured because of the Cold War politics going on being Capitalist and Communist bloc. The Islamization process has given legitimacy to the authority in power.

Working with Zia by K. M. Arif is an insider account of the military and political dynamics of Zia's regime. As depicts from the book's name *Working with Zia*, K. M. Arif, has closely worked with Zia's regime, and he has provided a descriptive version of the happenings going on in Zia's era. The book incorporates the detailed account of the political processes, decision making of Zia, Islamization as a strategy to rule, and the political shifts appeared in the neighboring country of Afghanistan followed by Pakistan's response.

Similarly, *Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jami'at-I Tulaba in Pakistan* by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr highlights the role of students in the politics of Pakistani campuses. These students became vehicle of Islamization in the student politics inside campuses. In Zia's regime, student politics was banned and the *Islami Jami 'at Tulaba*, charged with religious ideology, occupied the campuses. The students of IJT were instrumental in promoting particular ideals of *Jamaat Islami* which also served to Zia's political interests.

The new contribution researcher has added to the already prevalent debate is that I have focused on the politics of legitimacy in Zia's regime. The researcher adds that Islamization has been used as an instrument by Zia to gain political legitimacy. Apart from religion Zia has used political process, referendum, election on non-party basis, education, judiciary and media as a tool for the acquisition of political legitimacy. Zia has utilized the aforementioned apparatuses to construct an ideological framework designed to underpin and strengthen his political legitimacy.

Research Question:

This study seeks to explore the techniques and strategies which Zia-ul-Haq acquired to gain political legitimacy in Pakistan from, 1977-1988?

Methodology:

Ontologically, the research will be nominalist which directs that the reality of political legitimacy is nominalist. The researcher will consider that the nominalist approach contends that the reality is neither fixed nor concrete. Contrast to it, the reality of political legitimacy is constructive and is shaped by the state and society. Epistemologically, the researcher's approach is interpretive rather than positivist. This interpretivist approach will decide researcher's methodological approach which is qualitative in the case of political legitimacy of Zia's era. Moreover, researcher will use qualitative method with strong component of interpretation by using primary and secondary sources.

Discussion:

In 1977 elections, Bhutto had secured 155 seats out of the total 200 seats i.e. securing 80% of the general seats in the national assembly (Weinbaum, 1977, p. 599). After the elections, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) staged a street protest and rejected election results in totality. The PNA claimed that the elections were rigged and equally questioned the transparency of the elections. To substantiate it, Bhutto used the bureaucratic machinery in his favor. He put the responsibility of 'winning' elections on the shoulders of the bureaucracy and exempted the political workers from the election responsibilities (Niyazi, 1991, p. 20). The protest of PNA took momentum as the interests of the religious lot and business community synchronized. The religious leadership of PNA led the movement, and the urban traders of the Punjab financed it (Kochanek, 1983, p. 142). The situation deteriorated when PNA aspired to bring desired political results through street politics and this forced Bhutto to use coercion against the protesters which caused many casualties (Javed, 2019, p. 206-7). A committee consisting of government and opposition membersⁱ was then formed to sort out the plausible solution. The committee had reached to consensus, on the 2-3 July,ⁱⁱ (Waseem, 1998, p. 348, Also, Noman, 1989, p. 30) but Zia disrupted the political solution and imposed martial law on 5th July. With the imposition of martial law by Zia-ul-Haq he acquired the power through force, but he could not legitimize it. Legitimacy of the power could be acquired through the vote of the masses. The military dictators, including Zia, lacked vote because he had neither political party nor popular support. Therefore, he formulated pseudo-democratic strategies to legitimize the political power through coercion and consent. In the case of Zia, the Islamization process inside the state, Political maneuvering, regional instability in the form of Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and international factor contributed to his political legitimacy. In this paper, the researcher will only focus on the political maneuvering, Islamization of the state, Islamization of the society, using judiciary in one's favor, and serving imperial forces for gaining legitimacy.

Zia's Response to PNA's Political Demands:

Zia's response to PNA's political demands were strategic. Zia was ready to implement the Islamic demands of PNA by materializing *Nizam-i-Mustafa* in true spirit. Contrast to this, the political demand of the PNA in the form of conducting fair and free election was overshadowed. The PNA movement had two aspects i.e. religious and political. Zia and the praetorians hegemonic order was convinced that the materialization of the religious aspirations of PNA is more important than PNA's political demands (Nasr, 2001, p. 135). The manifestation of religious demands of PNA's was beneficial for both Zia and PNA. The arrangement will serve to bolster Zia's political legitimacy, while simultaneously addressing the PNA's core objective and aspirations. The political aspirations of PNA in the form of conducting fair and free election didn't benefit Zia and hence it was tactically delayed.

Election Postponement:

After the acquisition of power, Zia came as a savior of nation. In the very first speech to the nation, he declared that the martial law has been imposed for the stability of the state and as he has no political ambitions, so the election will be held within three months. The address states that:

“It must be quite clear to you now that when the political leaders failed to steer the country out of a crisis it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators. It is primarily, for this reason, that the Army perforce had to intervene to save the country. . . I would like to point here that I saw no prospects of a compromise between the People's Party and the PNA. . . It was feared that the failure of the PNA and the PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into chaos ... This risk could not be taken in view of the larger interests of the country ... But the Constitution has not been abrogated. Only the operation of certain parts of the Constitution has been

held in abeyance. Mr. Fazal Elahi Chaudhary has very kindly consented to continue to discharge his duties as President of Pakistan . . . I will discharge the duties of the Chief of Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator. Martial Law Orders and Instructions, as and when required, will be issued under my orders. I met Mr. Justice Yaqub Ali, Chief Justice of Pakistan, this morning. I am grateful to him for his advice and guidance on legal matters. I want to make it absolutely clear that neither I have any political ambitions nor does the Army want to be detracted from its profession of soldiering ... My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which would be held in October this year [1977] . . . I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule. . . I would not like to dissipate my powers and energies as Chief Martial Law Administrator on anything else . . . I hold the judiciary of the country in high esteem ... However, if and when Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Regulations are issued, they would not be challenged in any Court of Law ..." (Address to Nation by Zia, 5th July 1977).

The passage of time unfolded the reality that Zia had political ambitions in imposing martial law, and delaying elections. He wished to prevent the people's elected representatives from gaining power. By delaying the polls, Zia got the opportunity to undermine the opposition, which was committed for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Moreover, the postponement of election provided him time to restructure the political system. Zia seriously undermined Pakistan's political system by transforming it from parliamentary to presidential system (Laporte, 1991, p. 117). This investment of Zia which propagated authoritarianism remained cultured in post-Zia era, too.

The postponement of election has political purpose. One, under these conditions, President Zia's imposed stricter Martial Law and postpone elections indefinitely contributed to the end of the controversy surrounding PPP's chances of winning the upcoming elections. Secondly, during this period Zia worked persistently for political engineering and designed strategies to sustain himself and his ideologue in power. For the materialization of his desire, he introduced Islamization process for political purpose (Jaffrelot, 2018, p. 180). Moreover, for sustaining in power he used pseudo-democratic tools like referendum, party less elections, and political engineering while using Islam to gain political legitimacy.

Zia opposed Western-style democracy and believed it was inappropriate for Pakistan. The elections were postponed even further because of all these contentious talks. During this time, he coercively crushed the progressive political activists who were struggling for the restoration of democracy (Siddique, Interview, 20th July 2024). Apart from this coercion, he was working to install parallel system where he could face the least resistance followed by his political legitimacy. In this regard, his interests synchronized with *Jamaat-i-Islami* political agenda and launched Islamization program. Consequently, both Zia and *Jamaat-i-Islami* politicized Islam and pretended to make guiding principle of statecraft (Khan, Shah, and Rahman, 2020, p. 113). In this process, Zia gave political stakes to political leaders having religious orientation, and the religious leadership bestowed Zia with political legitimacy. These delaying tactics of the election remained continued till Zia secured his political stakes and legitimacy through referendum.

Referendum and Election on Non-Party basis:

Patently, the despotic and dictatorial regimes cannot sustain their rule for longer time in postcolonial states as they lacked legitimacy. Initially, they gain power arbitrarily and sustain it coercively through coercion. This politics of coercion couldn't be sustained for a longer time, and the dictator automatically civilianize the regime for political legitimacy. Zia regime was not different in its pattern, and it moved towards civilianization process in 1984 through referendum, and non-party elections in 1985.

The purpose of these two political techniques i.e., referendum and elections on non-party basis aimed to give legitimacy to the installed regime of Zia which lacked legitimate grounds. Now, as the Zia's regime had no popular support to give him simple or overwhelming majority, therefore he constructed an ideology of Islamization to convince masses that the regime will do something better for them. In this regard, the regime polarized the society and politics through the prism of this ideology. Consequently, those political forces which has religious orientation became closer to Zia. Contrast to this, the secular and progressive forces became in the limelight of regime to be suppressed.

In the political process, the politics of maneuvering remain prominent for Zia's political legitimacy. To substantiate it, Zia made the position of presidency directly proportional to the Islamization in the state. In the referendum of 1984, the question was posed that 'Do you want Islam in Pakistan'? The masses were left with two choices i.e., 'Yes' and 'No'. Zia had strategically equalized giving vote to Islam means that he would be accepted as president for next five years (Abbas, 2005, p. 117). Importantly, in the polls 62% casted votes and 97.71 voted for Zia and Islam (Abbas, 2005, p. 117). As the society was conventional, so they couldn't cast vote against Islam, and Zia took the benefit of this strategy by acquiring 'legitimacy' for next five years as a president of Pakistan.

Once presidency was secured then Zia moved towards process of civilianization of the system. The civilianization process was façade for legitimacy rather than civilianization in real sense. In this regard, election was held on non-party basis for a purpose to disassemble the popular political voices and introduce new political class ready for giving legitimacy to Zia at the cost of locating them at the power corridor. This non-party election brought new political forces having religious orientation. Importantly, this lot which got entry into politics used money in the election process (Siddique, Interview, 20th July 2024). Consequently, these new political forces had more interest in making money than politics.

The Politics of Islamization and Political Legitimacy:

To gain acceptability in masses Zia tightly touched the aspirations of common man. In the guise of Islamization program, Zia attempted to Islamize schools, legal system, and society. In the context of Islamization of education policy, Zia introduced the National Education Policy and Implementation Plan 1979. This education policy cultured the religiosity and concept of *Ummah* in the minds of students (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, 1979). Moreover, the *Islamiyat* subject was made compulsory, and the un-Islamic materials were removed from the textbooks (Khan, Shah, and Rahman, 2020, p. 117). At legal level, *Shariah* Courts were established which acquired the status of High Courts. These *Shariah* Courts were directed to make decisions in accordance with Islam and examine whether any law or provision of law is repugnant to Islam (Weiss, 1987: 11, and Jamal Malik, 59). Importantly, the *Hudood* ordinance and blasphemy laws were also introduced in Pakistan by convincing the masses that Zia's Road map will lead us to true Islamic state. At societal level, he made thousands of *madrassahs* and trained *mujahideen* and sent to Afghanistan to serve capitalist world interest. All these Islamic engagements from state to society aimed to get acceptability in society making road for his political legitimacy.

The Islamization and legitimacy:

Islamization served as Zia ul Haq's main instrument for achieving his political legitimacy. History manifests that Islam has been used as an instrument by the ruling elite since the inception of Pakistan. In 1980s the process of Islamization became swift and covered all aspects of life ranging from educational, legal, economic, and societal. By initiating the Islamization campaign, Zia ul Haq gained the greatest possible profit of acceptability inside the society for implementing the true spirit of Islam. In return, he was gaining support from society in the

name of Islamization as he lacked political party and political support to give him chance to sustain legitimately in the power corridors.

Educational Reforms and Legitimacy:

Education and textbooks are instruments for making an ideology and indoctrination. The education policies are being made by the ministry and materialized through the textbooks in schools. Therefore, the textbooks work as an agent of identity construction and indoctrination (Mohammad-Arif, 2005, p. 143-169) and formation of narrative (Brehm, 2014, 319-326). In 1979 Zia-ul-Haq introduced education policy which Islamized the education and textbooks (Saigol, 1995, p. 182). The *Islamiyat* subject was made compulsory for medical, engineering and other students pursuing graduate program. Importantly, the verses related to *Jihad* were incorporated in the school textbooks. Even the candidates who were appointed for different position especially teaching were asked questions related to Quran and *Sunnah*ⁱⁱⁱ in the interview panel (Saigol, 1995, p. 182).

Apart from textbooks institutions were being framed on the lines to pursue the Islamization process. In this regard, the formation of *Shariah* Training Institute, and International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) played an important role in giving Islamic training to students and *Ulema*. In universities the student organizations were banned to dismantle the progressive students, and the campuses were handed over indirectly to *Islami Jamaat Tulaba* (IJT) because of the fact *Jam'at Islami* was also close to power corridors at state level (Akhtar, 2018). Moreover, 3000 religious clerks i.e., ulema were inducted in the teaching field to teach *Islamiyat* and Arabic (Mumtaz, 1998, 106). Giving space to religious clerks in power corridors and educational institutions aimed gain political legitimacy.

Media control and Legitimacy:

The media of the state was also not exempted from this Islamization program. The T.V anchors, both male and female, were directed to wear *sherwani* and *dupatta* respectively. Those anchors who didn't follow the directions were forced to leave hosting programs. To substantiate it, Mahtab Rashdi, the host of *Apni Baat* on PTV didn't follow the orders of wearing dupatta and she left to host program till Zia was alive (Aziz, 2015). Every day the recorded *Khabarnama* was sent to Zia for review before being broadcasted (Newburg, 1995, p. 180-81). Again, the 'Islamization' of the media was employed as a strategy for political legitimacy, rather than genuine commitment for implementing the true principle of Islam. Religion was used as a tool to control the media and ultimately generating narrative in Zia's favor.

Enforcement of Islamic Legal Code and the mantle of legitimacy:

Coming to Power, Zia dismissed the constitution. The prevailing constitutional structure couldn't allow Zia to stay in power. Therefore, he introduced the provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) (Iqbal, 1986, 112). The promulgation of the PCO restricted the power of the judiciary and authorized Zia-ul-Haq to implement new laws. Once judiciary was tamed then it was colored with religiosity. To substantiate it, in 1978-79 *Shariah* benches were operationalized in high courts. In February 1979, *Hudood* Ordinances were introduced which replaced the British criminal code with Islami legal code (Kennedy, 1988, p. 307-16). In 1980 Federal Shariat Courts was instituted to decide the cases in accordance with the Quran and *Sunnah* (Kennedy, 1988, p. 308). To substantiate it, between 1980-1987 some 500 laws were either amended or changed (Arif, 1995, p. 132) and made in accordance with the Islamic teachings. The inclusion of blasphemy laws, the Laws of Evidence, and considering women testimony as worth half as that of man (Nasr, 2001, p. 140) were made part of the legal system. Ostensibly, the politics of Islamization of judiciary aimed to provide speedier justice than the Anglo-Saxon law (Arif, 1995, p. 255). But behind the curtain, the Islamization of the judiciary

had an esoteric aim in the form of diverting the attention of military's encroachment in the judiciary.

Islamization of Economic System, and Legitimacy:

Zia also tried to Islamize the economic system of Pakistan. In this regard religious scholars were consulted to give a suitable model for the implementation of Islamic banking without *Riba* i.e., interest. In this regard, *Zakat* was imposed, and 2.5 percent was deducted on the first *Ramazan*. Moreover, *Zakat* committee was formulated from central to tehsil level to distribute the *Zakat* being collected by the state authorities. As Zia was influenced by the *Sunni* religious scholars, and in this regards the *Shia* Muslims protested in Islamabad with the demand to be exempted from *Zakat* obligation to be paid to government. The reason behind the protest was that the *Shia* school of thought doesn't allow *Shia* community to distribute *Zakat* as prescribed by the *Sunni* interpretation of Islamic Law. In the words of Qasim Zaman, the imposition of the *Sunni* school of thought sharpened and radicalized the *Shia* identity, ultimately contributing to the rise of sectarianism (Zaman, 1996, 378). Zia had realized to the *Sunni* religious scholar that he is sincere in practically manifesting Islamic injunctions and in reward he was taking support and legitimacy from *Sunni Ulema* to rule.

Controlled Judiciary and legitimacy:

The judiciary of Pakistan has been remained subordinate, controlled, and then competitive in the political dynamics of Pakistan (Kureshi, 2022). Initially, it remained controlled and then it became competitive for making its own space in the power corridors. To substantiate, the judiciary of Pakistan is engaged in the power politics since the inception of Pakistan. In the Molvi Tameez-u-Din Case, judiciary became partner of the power structure and legitimize the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly under the pretext of the 'law of necessity'. The law of necessity was then cultured and intertwined in the legal decisions of the judiciary by giving political legitimacy to authoritarians and dictators.

In Zia's era the judiciary remained controlled by the Zia's management. The decision being done by judiciary was serving the interests of the of Zia. To substantiate, apex court legalized imposing martial law by virtue of success (Stavsky, 1983, p. 380). Consequently, the law of necessity was revived, constitution was suspended, new oath was taken from judges via Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). Those judges who were not ready for taking oath under PCO were forced to resign. To add, every action that was linked with the promotion of the constitutionalism and legal order of the state was suspended (Newberg, 1995, p. 165). Pathetically, the apex court allowed Zia to bring amendments in the constitution which legally entitled Zia to bring any kind of desired amendment in the constitution of Pakistan including the politics of undermining the human rights (Patel, 2000, p. 154-155).

Apart from legalizing martial law, Zia perpetrated number of acts which strengthened his role in power corridors. The list of these constitutional violation started with Bhutto's trail, formation of military courts, introduction of 8th amendment, institutionalization of presidential system, patronization of the newly entrepreneur-turned-politicians and dismantlement the organic and genuine political leadership. All these constitutional cum democratic violation inherently worked for the political legitimacy of Zia's rule.

Imperial Power and support for Zia's Regime:

To be clear, it was not only Zia's strategies being framed inside the states which imparted legitimacy to the politics of Zia. Contrast to it, the politics going on in the regional realm couldn't be exempted from the power politics in Zia's era. Patently, the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan followed by subsequent coming of the Russian forces at the gate of Kabul made ground for the suitability of Zia in the power corridors. This whole regional politics couldn't

be detached from international politics i.e., cold war happening between the capitalist and communist bloc.

This was not the engagement between capitalist and communist bloc. Historically, with the end of WWII and bipolarization of the world order, the struggle for the hegemony started between the USA and USSR. In this power politics both the blocs tested their fate in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The Afghanistan proved as a final field of this long engaging Cold War. The United State of America and Zia's regime designed a conjoint strategy of coping the Russian troops through *mujahideen*. John Perkin adds that US provided the armaments, Saudi provided funds and Pakistan provide *mujahideen*. (Perkins, 2004). To substantiate some 80,000 *mujahideen* had been sent to Afghanistan for countering Russians, and 7.2\$ billion had flew to Pakistan for Afghan *Jihad* as an aid for Afghan *Jihad*. The synchronization of the interests of the USA and Pakistan and their joint venture to contain the Russian forces provided legitimacy for the Zia's regime.

Conclusion:

In a nutshell, it can be stated that Zia's quest for political legitimacy was serious issue for Zia to rule for long period of eleven years. In this regard, politically and constitutionally, he couldn't make any suitable arrangements to acquire legitimacy. Therefore, he used the mosque, schools, textbooks, media, judiciary and political process in the form of pseudo democratic elections and referendum. Importantly, he took the mantle of Islamization as a viable shield for the political legitimacy of his rule. Zia has extended the politics of Islamization from state to society for his legitimacy. To substantiate it, he had introduced various legal reforms, *Hudood Ordinance*, Islamization of textbooks, implementation of *Zakat*, reconstituting Islamic Ideology Council (IIC), and *Shariah* Courts for the legitimacy of his rule.

References:

- Abbas, Hassan. (2005). *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (London: Routledge).
- Ahmad, Mumtaz. (1996). "The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the Military, and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan, 1977-1985" in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 3.
- Ahmad, Mumtaz. (1998). "Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism and Violence in Pakistan." In *Pakistan 1997*. edited by C. Baxter and C. Kennedy (Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers).
- Akbar, Muhammad Najm. (2010). *My Life: Living Through Pakistan's Traumas*. Raleigh: Lulu Press Inc.
- Akhtar, Aasim Sajjad. (2018). *The Politics of Common Sense: State, Society and Culture in Pakistan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Arif, K. M. (1995). *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Aziz, Shaikh. (2015). "A Leaf from History: Four Journalists Flogged, Two Newspapers shut", *Dawn*, May 3. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1179170> accessed on 30th August 2024.
- Brehm, W. C. (2014). "Strategic 'Linguistic Communities': The Political Struggle for Nationalism in School" in *(Re)constructing Memory: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the Nation*, edited by James H. Williams. Rotterdam: Sense. 319-326.
- Dorab Patel, Dorab. (2000). *Testament of a liberal*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gorgio Agamben, Gorgio. (2005). *The State of Exception*. trans., Kevin Attell. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Government of Pakistan, (1979). *National Education Policy and Implementation Programme*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.
- Interview with Siddique, Javed. (2014). Editor Nawa-i-Waqt, Islamabad, 20th July.
- Iqbal, Afzal. (1986). *Islamisation of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard).

- Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2018). "Secularity Without Secularism in Pakistan: The Politics of Islam from Sir Syed to Zia" pp. 173. in *A Secular Age Beyond the West: Religion, Law, and the State in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Mirjam Kunkler, John Madeley and Shylashri Shankar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Javed, Umair. (2019). "Ascending the Power Structure: Bazaar Traders in Urban Punjab" in *New Perspectives on Pakistan's Political Economy: state, Class and Social Change* ed. Matthew McCartney and S. Akbar Zaidi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jr, Robert Laporte. (1991). "Administrative Restructuring During the Zia Period" in *Pakistan Under Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq* ed. Shahid Javed Burke and Craig Baxter. Michigan: University of Michigan.
- Kazi, Taha. (2021). *Religious Television and Pious Authority in Pakistan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kennedy, Charles H. (1988). "Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of Hudud Ordinance", *Asian Survey* Vol.28, No. 3.
- Khan, Hashmat Ullah. Shah, Jamal. and Fida-Ur-Rahman, (2020). "Zia-Ul-Haq and the Rise of Religious Extremism in Pakistan" *Biannual Research Journal Grassroots*, Vol. 54, No. 1: 113.
- Khan, Sagheer Ahmad. (2016). *Governance in Pakistan: Hybridism, Political Instability, and Violence*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Kochanek, S. A. (1983). *Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kureshi, Yasir. (2022). *Seeking Supremacy: The Pursuit of Judicial Power in Pakistan*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Mark M. Stavsky, Mark M. (1983). "The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan", *Cornell International Law Journal* Vol. 16, No. 2: 380.
- Mohammad-Arif, Aminah. (2005). Textbooks, Nationalism and History Writing in India and Pakistan. In V. Benei (Ed.), *Manufacturing citizenship: Education and nationalism in Europe, South Asia and China*. London: Routledge. 143-169.
- Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. (2001). *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of the State Power*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newberg, Paula R. (1995). *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Niyazi, Kausar. (1991). *Last Days of Premier Bhutto*. Lahore: Jang Publisher.
- Noman, Omar. (1989). "Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy" in *Third World Quarterly* Vol.11, No. 1: 30.
- Perkins, John. (2004). *Confession of an Economic Hit man*. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publisher.
- Saigol, Rubina. (1995). *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*. Lahore: ASR Publications.
- Waseem, Muhammad. (1998). *Politics and State in Pakistan*. Lahore: Progressive.
- Waseem, M and S. Hayat. (1997). "Political Development and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan." *The Pakistan Development Review* 36 (4): 726.
- Weinbaum, M. G. (1977). "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 7: 599.
- Zaman, Qasim. (1998). "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shia and Sunni Identities." *Modern Asian Studies* 32: 3.

Notes:

ⁱ Mandate was given to Hafiz Pirzada and Professor Abdul Ghafoor for working on controversial points

ⁱⁱ Zia view is different. In an interview to Edward Behr, Newsweek, New York, Zia said that I am the only man

who took this decision at 5:00 pm on 4th July when I came to know that the talks between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and opposition leaders had broken down. Had the agreement been reached between them I would never have been imposed martial law. Document June-November 1977: General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's interview to Edward Behr of Newsweek, New York, *Pakistan Horizon*, Third and Fourth Quarter, Vol. 30, No. ¾, (1977), 228. See, Muhammad Waseem, *Politics and State in Pakistan*, Progressive, Lahore, 1998, p.348. See, Muhammad Najm Akbar, *My Life: Living Through Pakistan's Traumas* (Raleigh: Lulu Press Inc., 2010), 243-244. Also See, Omar Noman, 'Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy' in *Third World Quarterly* Vol.11, No. 1, 1989, 30.

ⁱⁱⁱ Contrast to this, in Ayub Khan's regime, the policy regarding the appointments of the teachers was based on the knowledge expertise in the relevant subject and commitment to teaching. See, Rubina Saigol, *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan* (Lahore: ASR Publications, 1995), 182.