

## **Alliance Politics in Pakistan: The Rise and Role of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (1988–1990)**

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### **Abstract**

This study investigates the emergence, evolution, and political significance of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) during the critical transition period of 1988–1990 in Pakistan. Formed in the aftermath of General Zia-ul-Haq's death, the IJI represented a broad coalition of right-wing, conservative, religious, and breakaway political factions including various groups of the Pakistan Muslim League, Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (Lakhvi Group), Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan, Nizam-e-Mustafa groups, and other like-minded organizations. Despite their diverse ideological orientations and organizational structures, these parties converged on the shared objective of countering the growing influence of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the first post-Zia elections. The study reveals that alliance formation within the IJI was shaped by a combination of political uncertainty, fear of a divided mandate, internal leadership rivalries, and the strategic intervention of state institutions seeking to engineer a competitive alternative to the PPP. Through an analysis of its internal negotiations, ideological motivations, and electoral strategies, the research demonstrates how the IJI functioned as both a political coalition and an instrument of structured opposition. Although inherently fragile due to competing ambitions and ideological contradictions, the IJI played a decisive role in shaping the electoral landscape of 1988 and set the stage for Nawaz Sharif's rise as a central political figure. The findings highlight that the IJI's formation reflected broader patterns of coalition politics in Pakistan, where temporary alliances emerge as strategic responses to institutional imbalance, weak party structures, and shifting civil–military relations, ultimately leaving a lasting imprint on the country's democratic trajectory.

**Keywords:** Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), Alliance Politics, Opposition Dynamics, Electoral Competition, Civil–Military Relations

### **Introduction**

Pakistan has a strong history of political alliances, all of which were formed at different times, for various reasons. Many agreements were created to meet short-term targets that were reached either in whole or in part. However none of the partnerships may stay together for a long period of time due to

a variety of factors. One such alliance was IJI. Although IJI has been formed with the idea that it will remain stable for a significant period of time and may inevitably be transformed to one national party rather than an alliance after some time. But one elusive dream remained. (Alam, 1988)

It is not uncommon for political alliances to be established in youthful democracy like Pakistan where there are various regional political parties and where there is a tradition of turbulent political upheavals. In reality, it is important to forge these political alliances in order to maintain a stable institutional system that will eventually contribute to the achievement of national political objectives that allow democracy to flourish in their wake. In Pakistan's history there have been several such alliances. It can be argued that because no political party was in a position to gain widespread favour nationally, compromises had to be made to accomplish even smaller targets. Several were political alliances such as the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) and the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), others were alliances of resistance such as the Democratic Action Committee (DAC), the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), and Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

The creation of alliances of parliamentary opposition, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), was also part of Pakistan's political history. Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), which was founded by eight political parties in 1988 to contest elections from a shared platform. (Mushtaq, 2015)

Pakistan is a multiethnic and multi-cultural society. The people are tied to various social identities and, with the passing of time, could not merge with each other. Another factor that has played a major role in shaping political behaviour is that most of the political parties and their electoral movements are limited to the cities. There are no daily elections for which politicians are not expected to consult the common people at the grass-root level and political development in 77 rural areas is ignored. Another significant characteristic of Pakistan's politics is the mushroom emergence of political parties. There were different political parties at the emergence of Pakistan which represented different regions. The Muslim League may be the national political party but in the regions that established Pakistan, it had negligible support. Different regional parties serve their regions, but the position of a national political party could hardly be played by either. Any of the political parties represent only unique ethnic groups such as the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), and have no control in other areas beyond their ethnic representation. Religious political parties are another characteristic of Pakistani politics, but they have never been able to have a robust programme to draw voters like IJI with representation in the region, but they can only win a few assembly seats. Another typical characteristic of Pakistan's politics is a small role of the political parties in various regions subdivisions within the political parties. Most of the parties are sub-split because of political leaders' personal grievances such as JUI, which was split into JUI (F) and JUI (Sami group) after Maulana Mufti Mahmood's death. (Malik, 1988)

Similarly, Muslim League is being renamed and granted recognition as Pakistan's president by various personalities including Ayub. Therefore, none of the political parties have been able to carry on the status of a mainstream political party and these parties have to make alliances in order to accomplish such mainstream political aims. Since 1954, political alliances have been a significant characteristic of Pakistan's history. United Front was founded in 1954 and political parties started to make alliances after that on numerous occasions. These alliances are established to unite common citizens at the national level such as the anti-Ayub movement, the anti-Bhutto movement and later the restoration of Pakistan's democracy. Any of the features of these alliances are typical as; they are made of hurry without having a clear strategic programme only to attain any immediate objectives. These alliances were unable to survive for a longer period of time; these alliances had considerable influence on the political trends but did not provide the people with a shared voice. Another point that should be illustrated is that under some cases these alliances offered a shared forum that avoided the creation of national political parties. IJI has been no exception. It was established in 1988 to fight elections against a common political foe without agreeing on fundamental issues that stopped the political leadership from having a shared political forum for the citizens of Pakistan that was hoped at the time of its formation. Any of the alliance's opponents say the agreement was made in hurry because it broke in a similar fashion. The creation and functioning of this coalition is addressed in depth in the following

chapter.

Alliances between political parties can be seen to be a natural product of weak bureaucratic systems and low political party financial bases. Viewed against the backdrop of persistent political instability and poor leadership, these alliances were often formed to accomplish short-term objectives that appeared to be impractical and based on 78 tenuous premises in terms of long-term priorities and values. It is fair to assume that transitory phases in developing countries create more problems for the masses and if political leadership is not strong and does not identify the country's major issues and try to tackle them in a united and systematic manner, these nations will always find it difficult to achieve political maturity because of their short-term political plans and alliances. (Mushtaq, 2015)

In 1988 Ghulam Mustafa jatoi founded Islami jamhoori ittehad. Nawaz Sharif had led this movement. It has headquarters in Islamabad lodges in parliament. Its philosophy was based on conservatism, and Green was the official colour. It was the largest conservative right wing alliance that was formed in September 1988 to oppose democratic socialism, primarily that year's Pakistan Peoples Party. The alliance consisted of nine parties, the main components of which were the Pakistan Muslim League, National Peoples Party, Jamaat-e-Islami and ANP with PML representing 80 percent of the IJI's election candidates. (Nasir, 1988)

In the National Assembly it won just fifty-three seats, along with the PPP winning ninety-two. In Punjab the majority of IJI seats were won. Nawaz Sharif emerged from the 1988 elections as the most powerful politician outside the PPP. He succeeded in forming an IJI administration in Punjab in December 1988, and became the chief minister of the province. From this power base he waged the political battles which ultimately led to his becoming prime minister in 1990. In the supercharged atmosphere of the 1990 elections, the electorate surprised observers. Neither the IJI nor the PPP had been expected to have a firm mandate to rule. Yet the IJI was given a strong governing mandate, winning 105 seats versus forty-five seats for the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), of which the PPP was the National Assembly's main constituent. Opposition leaders alleged selective seat rigging on a large scale not only to ensure victory for the IJI, but also to prevent the election of those opposed to military influence.

The IJI alliance no longer existed in the national elections of 1993 to bring all of the anti-PPP powers together. Instead of bolstering Nawaz Sharif's candidacy, the only person able to challenge Benazir Bhutto, the religious parties expended most of their energies trying to form a workable electoral alliance. (Shafqat, n.d.; Ahmad, 1996)

Prominent members of the coalition were Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Jamaat-i Islami (JI), and the National People's Party (NPP). The coalition also contained several minor parties and splinter groups of other political parties. These were Jamiat-ul Ulema- eIslam (Darkhwasti Party) (JUI-D), the Markazi Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Party) (MJAHL), Jamiat-ul-Mashaikh (Sahibzada Fazal-e-Haq Group) (JM), Agha Murtaza Poya (Poya) Hizb-e-Jihad (HJ), and the Independent Political Group (IPG) of Fakhar Imam. There appeared to be a blend of right wing, conservative political groups and a leftist faction (NPP). (Daraz, 1988)

It is widely accepted that it had nine party members but this is not accurate. This confusion usually derives from the fact that there were nine stars in its flag but those nine stars were merely symbolic of the coherence with PNA to show sincerity of intent with respect to the enforcement of Nizam-e Mustafa and an anti-PPP stance. In 1988 eight political parties, i.e. IJI, were founded. PM (Fida and Junejo Groups), JI, NPP, HJ, IPG, JUI-D, MJAHL and JM, With hindsight and by observing the opposition parties' meticulous political preparation, it is apparent that the main justification for the coalition was in fact to fight the influence of the PPP after the National Assembly was dissolved in 1988, but it was not the sole one reason. There are several disputes and counter-arguments concerning IJI and why it was created. This debate is listed below. (Faisal, 1988)

As stated earlier, there had been a large number of political parties in the course of Pakistan's political history, but this always resulted in a split mandate in the elections due to a difference in opinion among the parties and regional prominence of the political parties. In general, political alliances such as COP (1964-5) and PNA were created to prevent a broken vote before the polls. Elections in 1988 were no

exception. A lot of national and international political parties have agreed to contest the elections. They had sub-sections, too. Some of them also agreed to contest the polls from a shared forum to obtain better election results. In the 1988 elections the most popular coalition was the IJI. IJI was a coalition of numerous political parties, such that the member parties could only compromise on the specific points listed as the IJI's political platform which was later used as its election manifesto with minor modifications. (Z. Malik, 1988)

### **Reasons and Policy ities in IJI Development**

It is suspected that some officers of the middle and upper level army claimed in 1988 that the army was not responsible for solving the political problems. They claimed that the leaders were supposed to manage these matters and not the military services. That was one of the factors that kept the armed forces' high command away from politics following the Bahawalpur tragedy incident in August 1988. The army agreed it wanted to take some decisive measures to deal with the crisis in Pakistan, but it also agreed the people's elected government was in a stronger position to make such decisions. Among other decisions was an increase in the market price of petrol, coal, energy and more prevalent was the rate of import taxes. Political and regional concerns such as the resolution of the Biharis in Karachi that local people were unable to consider feeling would have a detrimental effect on Sindhi nationalism and the building of the Kalabagh Dam could be best managed by a representative administration. This was a moment when many wanted the army would take over the government and elections to be postponed for an indefinite duration, but the army kept itself away from overt interference in political structures as the Military establishment and the Army Chief felt the military should be staying away from politics for some time to come. In order to keep the army out of overt participation in domestic affairs, the military and bureaucracy needed a PM whose behavior and actions could easily be manipulated by them for corporate and possibly national purposes. It intended to steer the course of political activity and keep itself free from overt participation in politics. It is said that the ISI military placed its vision on the lawmakers and led the political parties that opposed the PPP to join an electoral coalition. Many people still claim that it was only conceivable that political parties succeeded in forming a coalition, which was called IJI, thanks to military advice and funding. Though it's not true that the army guidance made the creation of the IJI feasible, it is not true that the position of the army can be absolutely denied. (Adam, 1988)

General Aslam Beg, the then Army Leader, acknowledged that it was he and Ghulam Ishaq Khan who wanted to reconcile the right-wing parties in order to prevent a negative effect of confrontation between the right-wing and left-wing parties which could only be stopped if both were on an even footing, which was only possible if the right-wing parties were unified. Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmad claimed that the establishment of IJI or a right-wing coalition was appropriate because the country was facing serious crises as a result of the Bahawalpur incident in which the top leadership of the armed forces had been killed. The urgent imperative was that as many right-wing votes as possible could be gained to avert a constitutional crisis. He said this action was not intended to deter either group from gaining a simple majority but was meant to stop the detrimental consequences of political strife and ISI was successful as the 1988 elections remained open, equal and peaceful. Brigadier Imtiaz, while persuading of IJI members to join IJI, advised them that it was the only way to keep her, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter and Chairperson of the PPP, out of power. (Sallahuddin, 1988)

In addition, the army claimed the PPP was not honest with the country mainly because of the PPP leadership's relationship with the Jewish lobby in America. The army decided to form the IJI in order to avoid the possibility of PPP winning an overwhelming majority at elections. Fear of PPP's growing popularity increased by the establishment, and it did not want PPP to highlight the issue of Z.A. Bhutto death penalty. One of the main purposes in creating IJI was to curtail PPP's powers and continue some of Zia's policies, particularly Islamization policy. One can see the contradictions in these few lines but these contradictions are found in the statements of those who played a major role in the formation of IJI. No clear argument about the formation of IJI has yet been established but many other reasons can also be attributed as explained by various politicians. Below are some of those discussed.

### **Political bases for IJI formation**

Members of the IJI clarified that the coalition was formed to fill the political vacuum created by the 'Like Minded, Islam Loving Religious Political Parties' split. It was thought to be created to regain people's faith in democracy and to establish real Islamic democracy, not just for the sake of acquiring power or the right of a few "option" politicians to govern. The key item on the agenda was imposing Shari'a (Islamic Law) in Pakistan. IJI leadership declared on numerous occasions that IJI would preserve its solidarity for Pakistan's independence and the implementation of Shari'a which was the fundamental reason for its existence. Different political leaders in their own way defended establishing the IJI. (Hashmi, 1987) Maulana Sami and Qazi Hussain Ahmad said there was a need for a broader alliance to establish consensus on national issues and to implement Shari'a in Pakistan for which IJI was established. It was also necessary for the country's unity, and to preserve law and order, according to Maulana Sami. He also found it necessary to help the fight for democracy in Afghanistan. He said the coalition had been created to return the world to true democracy. The Deputy Secretary General of JUI (D), Maulana Zahidur Rashidi, made essentially the same claims. He also backs the idea of making Pakistan a nuclear plant, however. In the other hand, PPP had promised America and India that it would scale back the nuclear programme, when it came to power. The IJI leadership has also emphasized the security of Pakistan's nuclear centers as its primary priority. Agha Murtuza Poya deemed IJI a Jihad (Holy War on Non-Muslims) coalition. Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan's Pir Fazale Haq said IJI was not a family group but was founded in Pakistan to implement the Quran and Sunna. It was maintained that the coalition was created to regulate liberal forces and have an Islamic structure and "decent" politics for the citizens of Pakistan. Qazi Hussain Ahmad repeatedly said that IJI was created to foil the conspiracies hatched by Islam and Pakistan's enemies as it was assumed that PPP would not follow or implement any of Zia's policies, including Islamization, which seemed not to be reasonable to the people. It was also true that the odds of PPP's success in the polls were high, but other political parties and interest groups that had aligned with Zia's legacy were part of IJI. Many politicians thought that fear of PPP's victory made the rest of the parties ever more unified, mainly to be able to fight elections as a stronger party with one shared platform. A senior IJI official, IJI secretary-general Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, also stated that the anti-PPP coalition was set up to prevent an absolute victory for the PPP in the polls. IJI Amir told the people that the coalition was created to remove the chances that any group acting against Islamic teachings would come to power; while the goal of PPP was to eradicate all types of violence against women, to bring all laws into line with current socio-economic realities.

In addition, attempts to shape a PML (J) coalition with the PPP also convinced some to be united but in the minds of both sides, owing to concerns and suspicions about a joint venture, they were unable to devise a coalition. Pir Pagara, Junejo's adviser, was not prepared to collaborate with PPP, which was also an impediment to the establishment of the alliance, and Junejo formed an alliance with Tehrik-i Istiqlal Pakistan (TI) and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) called Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI).

PML and other pro-establishment parties were worried about the political power of PPP and the increasing popularity index. To fight PPP's rising strength, these parties agreed to create a broad-based coalition called IJI. Before that coalition, two parties opposed PPP; PAI, a three-party coalition, and the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) which was later called IJI to draw more voters with PML (F) leadership and four caretaker chief ministers. This political parties understood the fact their differences strengthened the PPP. It was assumed that the IJI could also become a powerful political force with the backing of four chief ministers and IJI's organisational capability.

Jatoi, eager to become Pakistan's PM, was well aware of the fact that he couldn't gain a majority under the banner of a newly formed faction, the NPP, in the presence of PPP and Benazir. He was supported in the caretaker cabinets at the national and provincial levels by nominating ministers, from his party, to link hands with PML (F). There were small disagreements between the NPP and PML over their foreign policy and islamization of the country's rules, but both sides were considered to be able to

manage the problems efficiently so the coalition was formed. For the 1988 elections both parties agreed to have similar candidates. Both Nawaz Sharif and Jatoi sought to bring other political parties into the coalition. Jatoi wanted an influential man in the Punjab region and he preferred Nawaz Sharif. JI later joined hands with other minor groups and founded IJI. PML and JI joining IJI was a political move, as both parties had separate bases and were willing to support each other with their voting base and street force respectively.

Smaller parties have opted for a broader coalition to hold themselves in the country's political arena. Under IJI's banner these parties feel comparatively comfortable and confident in their future. Many democrats together managed to stop right-wing democrats' elections. The acceptance by Syed Fakhar Imam to join the IJI has been viewed as positive. The mentality was said to drive the right wing parties to victory. The Shari'a enforcement slogan was also used in its election campaign as a primary objective of IJI. (Jan, 1988)

Also a cause of tension for the pro-Zia faction was the split of PML into PML (F) and Junejo League following the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1988. That is why attempts have been made to form a national coalition to create a stronger PPP rivalry in the forthcoming elections. While these attempts did not prohibit PPP from coming to power, it could not prove to be the country's supreme force which gave ISI and Ghulam Ishaq Khan the ability to influence PPP government decisions. Holding these points in mind some of IJI's detractors assumed that IJI's component groups had divergent philosophies with just one shared point — the animosity to PPP. There is another important aspect, which was that both of these parties were practising right-wing policies but it was not something that could push all parties to a single forum according to the alliance's critics. Various citizens, writers, political parties and others offer many explications about the nature of this coalition. A few common explanations were as follows for making this alliance:

1. A lot of people were supposed to be deserting the PPP and they might easily tie in with the current coalition
2. There was a possibility that many of the people would win their guarded electoral circles and it is often easier to exploit the opinion of Individuals as opposed to national parties that are persuasive
3. Most IJI component groups were funded by top military officials or it had been directly or implicitly affiliated with the military dictatorship
4. The presence of the judiciary has made producing the necessary outcomes in the elections. It was then considered an important tool for manipulating election performance from a wider coalition rather than party or corporate parties.

Considering the reasons for the formation of the IJI it is revealed that the formation of a broad based alliance was the result of many factors such as weak political organization of political parties, the army's wish to keep out of politics and the establishment's probe that the PPP should not be allowed to form the government at least with a clear majority. In addition, the IJI member parties also had their own explanations for joining the alliance which are listed below:

One rationale for the alliance's formation was to fight the PPP's influence but it was not the only justification since IJI's member parties had their own motives to join the alliance. Many political observers claim that IJI component parties have little in common but that members of the IJI had at least three important points in common at the time of alliance forming.

- I. Wish for a fast social Islamisation
- II. Aid for Afghan Cause
- III. Fear of the PPP.

### **Components of the Alliance**

**Pakistan Muslim League (PML):** The PML (F) found itself in desperate trajectories after Zia's assassination, when the government had vowed free and equal elections. As a caretaker government, winning the elections had been a matter of personal prestige for the PML (F). His leader Fida M. Khan and other influential leaders agreed to ally with like-minded political parties in order to preserve their place in politics. It shows the party missing the structure and trust needed to win the elections.

The PML lacks the ability to get voters organised. The PML had a strong neoliberal base of support. But the dedicated, coordinated, and active portions of urban society lacked coordination, preparation and funding. This shortcoming was solved by forming an alliance with JI that enjoyed the patronage of some of the best orators. Even it had a war system. Though there were ideological gaps between PML, JI and other member groups, JI was a well-organized party representing middle class interests. His organisation of students was well superior to all others and had a country-wide set-up. PML wanted a lot of time to develop its middle-class support base and set up a national set-up. At the time, it was easier to gain support from JI and other religious and right wing parties in the grassroots polls for the progress of IJI. Ejaz Gillani, a political analyst, was of the opinion the PML lacks a clear link at grass root level between the leaders and the masses that pushed it into coalition politics. Following the dissolution of the assemblies in May 1988, Nawaz Sharif noticed that PML was not formed in other provinces except the Punjab so he decided to make a coalition with other parties in order to win the elections and stop the right-wing parties' division of votes.

**Jamaat-i-Islami (JI):** JI had five fundamental conditions for membership in the alliance:

- The withdrawal of its students and staff from the party
- Lifting School and Trade Union Prohibitions
- Bringing Afghanistan's Jihad to its logical end
- Continuity of peaceful nuclear programme
- Improving Islamic System

Qazi Hussain Ahmad told the media-men that he was well aware of JI's winning quantum chances in the polls. So, he agreed to join the IJI to play an important role in Pakistan's decision-making. JI found the IJI's Islamic intentions to be the primary source of its coalition membership. Qazi Hussain Ahmad said IJI had made Islamic agenda the highest priority. The alliance leadership's pledge of implementation of Shari'a was another justification for JI to join IJI. It had also vowed to help the Afghan Jihad and follow JI's five-point agenda, which culminated in JI joining hands with IJI groups. He was also pleased with the leadership of the IJI, which shares the view with JI that the elections had to be held on November 16, 1988. The change in government could bring about improvement in the Afghan policy and JI wanted to prevent any improvement in it so it agreed to join IJI. JI hoped to turn its votes into assembly seats on the IJI ticket. To the point worth noting, the Jamaat has never been able to achieve support, as it could gain just four seats in the National Assembly in 1970 elections. Despite the contentious elements of that referendum, the outcome did not bring about a significant shift in its position at the 1977 polls. Given its past record, the Jamaat leadership found it more favourable to being part of any coalition in order to play a significant role in the country's governance. Student unions were not reinstated but if the elections were held, IJI accepted removal of all cases against IJT. JI entered the coalition partly because it was well conscious that winning a major election victory as an independent party would not be easy.

Qazi Hussain Ahmad claimed that the JI would work with all of the political parties that claimed in Islam and the country's unity including active support to the Afghan Jihad. Qazi Hussain Ahmad also met with JUI (F) Fazal's leader to co-operate with each other in the elections, claiming that the religious political parties' joint cooperation could produce better results in the elections. He was also able to work with Khan Abdul Wali Khan only if he acknowledged the Afghan Mujahideen's victory in Afghanistan. JI Maulana's Naib Amir (vice president) Jan Muhammad Abbasi also participated in getting religious and like-minded parties under one banner for the promulgation of Islamic Order in the region.

Professor Khurshid Ahmad alleged that JI joined the IJI because Nawaz Sharif and his companions were reluctant to take part in the elections unless IJI was improved so that they could compete with PPP particularly when Sharif's relationships were also strained with PML leadership. This convinced JI to join IJI because IJI's leadership did not want to postpone elections and JI decided to work with it to the same end.

**National Peoples Party (NPP):** Jatoi was of the opinion that Pakistan needed a central government, as it was a crucial time for the country's national unity and dignity and democratic development. He

specifically expressed his desire to ally with like-minded parties except PML (J) and the PPP. It was for this cause that he had been engaged in negotiations with a few MRD political parties and several others for substantial success in the upcoming elections. The NPP's first achievement in this respect was its electoral coalition with PML (F) and the decision was supported by both party members as a significant source of progress in the elections and played a critical role. M. Ibrahim Jatoi clarified that the coalition had been formed to initiate a joint election campaign to win the polls to form a broad-based government. Jatoi told the press that he had three choices. He may be entering MRD, PML (F) or groups outside MRD's fold. He said joining PML (F) seemed to him more realistic, as it was best among other options available. For Jatoi's removal from the coalition or the cabinet was out of the question due to his disagreements with PPP leadership. Some opponents of the NPP's alliance with PML (F) were of the opinion that NPP made an alliance with PML (F) to get Ghulam Mustafa Khar (Khar) (formerly C.M. and Governor Punjab under the ZAB regime) released from prison but Nawaz Sharif refuted the fact as the alliance's base. (Hussain, 1988)

**Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan (JMP):** IJI also declared that it would help all of the groups committed to upholding Shari'a. IJI used Shari'a compliance as the basic motto for its campaign, and gave it a significant role in its manifesto, which prompted JMP to join the coalition.

**Hizb-e Jihad (HJ):** Agha Murtaza Poya professed to be joining the IJI because it was an acceptable choice for his party. He said the party manifesto was almost identical to IJI's simple policy. These two have become the alliance's driving force. Another explanation that was not stated openly, but was apparent from the party's condition, was its political standing among the masses. A freshly formed party, barely recognisable to the electorate, suffering from a shortage of representatives did not hope to win the elections. But it was more important to join a large coalition in order to succeed in the diplomatic situation, rather than living in isolation. Extreme negative views on the PPP made the Hizb-e Jihad appealing to the IJI, and it was admitted as an alliance member.

**Independent Political Group (IPG):** ISI welcomed the party through Ch. Shujaat Hussain. IPG agreed to join IJI because IJI's political agenda suited its policies. Another justification for joining IJI was that participation in elections in its individual capacity was not well coordinated.

**Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhwasti Group) (JUI-D):** JUI (D) Secretary General Maulana Zahidul Rashedi said JUI (D) joined IJI for the dominance of Islamic rule, funding for Afghan Jihad and nuclear acquisition. He said JUI (D) will continue to support IJI until these values are followed.

Taking into account the viewpoints of IJI member groups, it is clear that it was only those groups who joined IJI who thought it was strategically secure to do so. Major parties like JI, who had street power but not enough votes, wanted other parties' support. While it had a political agenda, its former support for martial law undermined its reputation among ordinary citizens along with its small voting bank that could not turn its vote into assembly seats. At the same time PML (F) without any particular goal and PML (J) having three years of service to the people while being fragmented into camps could not establish a single coalition to anticipate a fair victory in the elections. The creation of such alliances does not seem to be anything especially unusual in the light of these conditions.

### **A Brief Introduction of Coalition Parties of IJI**

PML, JI, and NPP Jatoi were popular alliance participants. The IJI also included several minor parties and splinter groups of other political parties. JUI (Darkhwasti Group), Markazi Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group), Jamaat-ulMashaikh (Sahibzada Fazal-e-Haq Group), Hizb-e-Jihad (Agha Murtaza Poya) and the Separate Political Party of Fakhar Imam were among others. There was a fusion of right wing, conservative political groups and a reform faction (NPP). Discussing these parties' political agendas and political experience is necessary in order to get a deeper understanding of their position within the coalition. An analysis of these parties' past would also be useful in understanding the complexities that hindered the alliance's formation. It would also help to understand the sources of friction between members of the coalition during their service as a coalition of parliamentary opposition during 1988-90 and as an alliance of parliamentary government during 1990-93.

## **Right-Wing Political Parties**

### **1. Pakistan Muslim League (PML)**

The Pakistan Muslim League was the successor of the All India Muslim League (AIML) created to secure and safeguard the Muslims' rights in this region. Its fundamental purpose was to strengthen the relationship between the British Government and the region's Muslims. It did a dual policy to this end. It sought to prepare the Muslim community to cooperate with the British and to protect the rights of the Subcontinent's Muslims by presenting them to the government in a convincing, respectable and comprehensive way. (Shafqat, n.d.; Ahmad, 1996)

The Muslim League led British India's Pakistan movement and enjoyed support from the landed elite and middle classes but within a few years of Pakistan's inception it lost support from the middle classes to take on a government party role. There were many problems that took people away from the PML i.e. lack of character in the political leadership, weak party system, lacking a political programme to inspire the common people and solve their problems, control of traditional elite and feudal who were hardly interested in democracy, control of military and bureaucracy on the state and absence of free and fair elections. It mainly enjoyed the selective support of the bureaucracy, the military elite and businessmen.

Chaudhry Khaliqz Zaman has been elected president of PML following Quaid's death. As a politician, he believed that political and other issues need to be discussed with him as the president of the ruling party, but due to the attitude of some PML members including Liaquat Ali Khan, AIML's Gen. Sec. and Pakistan's first prime minister; he could not adopt this policy. A movement against Chaudhry Khaliqz Zaman has led to his resignation from the party president's office. After him, Liaquat Ali Khan became president of PML. He appeared to be more able to take care of the organisation of the party but he was assassinated in 1951. Only with the cooperation of the Bureaucracy the PML maintained its status. The party had faced internal problems and conflicts among its leaders even during Liaquat Ali Khan's lifetime. Liaquat combined the PML presidency with the office of Pakistan's PM, which was followed by his successors. His status has been challenged especially by E's political parties. Pak. Landlords and landed aristocracy strengthened their hold over the party, and the party leadership ignored the principles of politics based on democratic values.

Both alliances were decided to maintain their independent status but would still cooperate in the elections. In this way, eighty seats were given to PML, and fifty seats would be given to the IJI parties. PAI or the Pakistan People's Alliance demanded 33 per cent of the total seats to join the IJI. TI and JUP had to have 35 seats each and the remaining seven would have to be decided on merit. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani believed the PAI would retain a separate position. He insisted it had to follow the Junejo and PAI decisions since the Fida Group joined PML Junejo. Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi said ticket distribution was a matter of merit and not a question of quota. The discussion of making a political alliance between PAI and IJI did not materialize. With regard to the issue of ticket distribution, both alliances could not come up with a workable solution. PAI had an easy ticket distribution as for most constituencies; PML (J) didn't have the appropriate candidates. At the same time, these were the only three parties, so decision on the issue was easier. IJI already had to share party tickets with eight political parties, so it was difficult for it to adequately satisfy three more parties without alienating either party.

Following this episode, the League's Junejo faction decided to leave PAI and take part in the elections under the banner of IJI. A connection was made between the unification of PML and fear of a PPP victory in the upcoming elections. JI's also took pride in this unification. The PML members were satisfied with the unification that they believed they could compete with PPP without using the support of another alliance, even though they were not opposed to an alliance either. They were of the opinion that if the country had two political camps, it would also be good for the country's growth of democracy. Small PML factions such as Daultana, Qaiyum, Pagaro, Khairuddin and Qasim League joined the PML (F) faction, which later became a major political force following its merger with PML's Junejo faction. By this time NPP (Jatoi) also joined PML (F) in early September Professor Khurshid

Ahmad of JI was of the opinion that recent steps had been unwise. Both IJI and PAI believed that PML would remain their member after unification. There was an impression that the two alliances would be submerged after PML unification. Junejo tried to unify the two alliances but they had various manifestos and the parties' personalities were too varied and opposed to each other. JUP and JI were separated by poles. They had a difference of opinion on two important issues: the nuclear programme and the Afghan question. Professor Khurshid said that IJI was an Islamic alliance and had a very clear position on Islamic ideology, on the nuclear issue, on foreign policy and on India relations. He said any party or alliance that would agree with the plan might join the alliance. It was also compelled by JI's opposition to PAI to join IJI. JI had not joined PAI for its pro-Moscow and pro-India stance on the Afghanistan issue, so it was not practical, according to JI, to combine both alliances for having an opposite opinion on the fundamental issues of that period. (Khan, 2005)

In local politics, the unification of both alliances could make it even more difficult to share the seats. Some of the people believed that after the unification of PML there was no need for an alliance with any other party. Many of the PML members believed that they did not need to be involved in any alliance in order to win the election, so they should contest the election in their own individual capacity. During the various phases of political history, the rulers who needed to legitimise their rule sought PML support. This was the case because it was said in 1954 that PML and Pakistan's government were one and the same, and could not survive without the other's support. Keeping this in mind, Ayub, Zia, and Junejo gained legitimacy by including PML in government but in 1988 realizing their weakness PML decided to join an eight-party alliance to win the elections.

## **2. Independent Political Group (IPG)**

Syed Fakhar Imam founded the "Independent Political Group," involving most of his National Assembly colleagues who wished to oppose the government's policies in 1986. This assembly was elected on the basis of non-political party elections. Later a need for an organised opposition was felt in the assembly, and a significant step was taken by the National Assembly's former speaker (Fakhar Imam). It was meant to be understood that all those contesting the elections had accepted Zia's policies and would run the system on a non-party basis but without a democratic opposition.

The IPG's first general secretary was Makhdoon Javed Hashmi. The group consisted of more than 70 MNAs from the 1985 Assembly, which had been reduced to 33 members due to efforts by the government to win support from most of the MNAs. He joined IPG after Syed Fakhar Imam resigned as the National Assembly Speaker and was later elected as the head of this political group. This group's agenda was to: 1) To facilitate democratization, 2) Fixing socio-economic justice, 3) Improving common man's quality of life it required, 4) Elections based on a party, 5) Reinstatement of the 1973 constitution and repeal of the eighth constitutional amendment, 6) It also requested a uniform president and a balance between the powers of the president and the country's prime minister.

## **Religious Political Parties**

The most important task following Pakistan's creation was to frame a constitution for it. Religious parties have been pressing hard from the outset to form an "Islamic" constitution as they believed Pakistan was made in the name of Islam. On January 13, 1948, JUI, for the first time at a political forum, demanded the establishment of Islamic political order in Pakistan. A history of IJI member parties and their manifestos is discussed below to explain their workings and attitude towards Pakistan's political system and its constitution. It will also help explain those parties' behaviours under the IJI banner.

## **Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)**

Ji is a structured religious political party with a democratic organisational setup. It has a precise attitude towards the Islamization of laws, but lacks the necessary flexibility to achieve its political goals. It was formed on 26 August 1941 by Abul Aala Maududi. According to Maududi, its sole purpose was to purify the society and prepare a team of people who could work for the glory of Islam."

Maududi wanted to guide Muslims in all spheres of life to put Islam into practise. He believed that JI was not only for the Subcontinent 's Muslims, but that it had a comprehensive international agenda to help all Muslim countries develop their social agenda, political, economic, and public life according to the set pattern of Islam. Piety was the basic condition to join JI.

JI was against communism and western culture. According to the JI ideology, the survival of the Muslims of the whole world was in the adoption of the role of the preachers of Islam. It was of the view that under the western democratic system, the Muslim community may be fused with the other communities of united India. It warned them to be careful in maintaining their separate identity and religious uniqueness for which a group of religious guides, who could devote their lives to educating the Muslims, was needed. Maududi worked for many years to create an environment in which people could accept his thinking before Jamaat was formed. After the Pakistan Resolution was approved in 1940, Maududi wanted to raise awareness among Muslims about establishing a government based on Islam's teachings. Not many people listened to Maududi's suggestions so he decided to form a political party that could more effectively spread his message to the people. That political party was named JI in August 1941. In its inaugural session in 1941, Maududi said that Islam derived from the workings of this party, its aims and beliefs, and that was why it was named Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Party). In the beginning Punjab, UP, Deccan and Madras responded positively to the message of JI but with the passage of time it was able to spread its message to other regions as well.

After Pakistan was created, JI took an active part in politics that was not unanimously accepted and many prominent JI leaders gradually left it. The change in JI's functions took place. It has played an important part in the constitution formulation process. It demanded that the guiding principles for the constitution be laid down, since it felt that otherwise it might not follow Islam's teachings. According to it, ML's leadership was familiar with Western education and had a clear tilt towards Western democracy that could hinder the implementation of Islamic laws. The Objective Resolution was passed in 1949 because of the efforts of the religious parties and twenty-two guiding principles were suggested unanimously by the religious scholars of all sects and different schools of thought in 1951. JI played a major role in getting those twenty-two points approved. In November 1955, a nationwide movement began with JI leadership demanding to formulate the constitution in accordance with Islamic teachings which were also supported by other political parties. JI accepted the 1956 constitution with a little criticism.

### **Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhwasti Group) (JUI-D)**

The JUI was created in October 1945 in response to Jamiat Ulema-i Hind's activities backing congress. In fact, it was made to support the idea of ulema Pakistan. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was elected first to support Jinnah prior to Pakistan's inception, and was a member of its first constituent assembly. It had been a great support for All India Muslim League in the elections of 1945-6 and in NWFP plebiscite, Sylhet. In December 1947 the party was organised in Pakistan. After Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani death, Syed Suleman Nadvi became party head. It used to be better arranged at East Pakistan and took part in the elections 1954 in Nizam-e Islam Party coalition. On 13 January 1948 JUI demanded that Islamic political order be enforced in Pakistan. (Akhund, 2000) Worked hard was done to bring the constitution into harmony with Islamic principles. By its efforts there was a convention of thirty-one religious scholars, and twenty-four basic scholars principles that are guiding principles for all governments were decided Pakistan on enacting Islamic injunctions in Pakistan 's constitution. The conference was presided by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. JUI remained active in politics after resigning from government opposition in all of Z. A. Bhutto rule. Its victory was in the 1977 elections In Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, more comprehensive JUI challenged election Under PNA Alliance. JUI was instrumental in the anti-Bhutto movement.

JUI's fundamental purpose was to gather religious scholars under the JUI banner to strengthen unity among the Muslim community. It was also keen to work for enforcement from Shari'a and bring all aspects of their lives in line with the preaching of the Holy Prophet PBUH. It was a critic of both with regard to the state's economic system capitalism and communism, and instead wanted a balanced

system inviting the extremist version of both. It wished to establish an Islamic society. It wanted to use the education system as an instrument for this. The education according to JUI Pakistan needed a system that would help people embrace Islam with all of its aspects and instill the true spirit of Jihad in the defence of the country and the work for it overall society improvement. As regards foreign policy, it wanted to support all Muslim countries enslaved by other countries and wishing to work to protect the rights of Muslim-born non-Muslim communities including countries. She also believed in freedom of expression and speech. (Ansar, 1991)

### **Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (Lakhvi Group) (JAH)**

In 1955, JAH was formed by the followers of the religious group Ahl-e Hadith. After Sahaba [Saint Prophet's Companions PBUH] and Tabieen they believed [Companions of the Holy Prophet PBUH's Companions] People added their own aspects to their beliefs which were not relevant to the Holy Prophet's actual teachings (PBUH) and thus was split into different groups. They think those problems can only be solved if the Muslims consult the Qur'an and Hadith rather than consulting interpretations of the various religious scholars. Formed in 1955 as a purely non-political Religious intent. Maulana Daud Ghaznavi was his first President. JAH began its political career in 1970, and took part in the general elections 1970. When the party started, Maulana Moeen Uddin Lakhvi became its president, for which he was first mentioned by some authors that party's president. Jamiat was the first to contest the 1970 elections and one of the members Maulana Moeenuddin Lakhvi became a national member. He joined Majlis-e-Shura in 1982, under Zia's rule. He was a part of the PNA Mustafa Nizam-e Movement. It became in the 1985 and 1990 elections MNA. Jamiat faced a bidirectional split in 1982. One known as Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith and the other was named Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith Markazi who joined IJI later as Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (group Lakhvi). Both groups merged into one in 1990 and remained a part of IJI.

### **Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan (JMP)**

JMP was formed and registered by Pir Fazale Haq (Pir Fazal) in 1963 headed by Dewal Sharif Sheik Mashaikh Pir Sahib Pir Abdul Majid. Great numbers of Pirs from all over the country who belonged to various branches of Tasawuf linked to this. Their central leaders were Pir Sahib Zakori Sharif and Pir Sahib Manki Sharif, Pir Sahib Ouch Sharif, Bahu Sharif, Pir Sahib Sultan, Taunsa Sharif, Pir Sahib Khura Sharif, Pir Sahib Sharaqpur Sharif, Pir Sahib Saida Sharif, and Pir Sharif Pinanwal Sharif, Pir Sahib Sehjuwal Sharif and more Sajjada Nasheen, Mashaikh and Ulema. It had been formed as a representative of Pakistan's Ulema (religious scholars). Its fundamental purpose was to serve mankind and to spread the teachings of religious scholars. Unless he was a Muslim, he had no hard and fast rules for his membership strong faith in the finality of Holy Prophet's Prophethood (PBUH). This was partying flag of dual shades green (Muslims' representative) and white (Muslims' representative). Security of non-Muslims rights in Pakistan. On October 8, 1988 additional Sec. General Sahibzada Roohul Moeen Dewal Out of central Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan denied any alliance membership. He informed reader it was a religious organisation and a non-political one. He said the party decided to back any political party which has demonstrated its commitment to enforcing Shari'a country. Pir Fazl (JMP) later agreed in telephone discussions with PML leaders to join the alliance (IJI) and its first national election appearance was in the run-up to the flag IJI.

### **Hizb-e Jihad (HJ)**

The party was formed in 1988, after the National Assembly was dissolved. Agha Agha Murtaza Poya believed that the political arena had a vacuum, and that the HJ could fill it. But before he formulates his manifesto or the fundamental principle of how the party until that times none of the prominent politicians had joined IJI. Except Poya himself, the party became president and convocator of the Partnership. ( Ahmad, 1988)

## **Manifesto**

- Achieving Islamic ethics
- The rule of law shall be in force in the country
- Equitable Economic Balance
- Foreign policy oriented towards Muslim third world
- Sovereign deterrence based on the technological tri-axes of the professional peoples.

Poya said it was almost similar to what the IJI adopted as the manifestation of its elections what made him to join the Covenant.

## **Nizam-e Mustufa Group (NMG)**

In 1985 Haji Hanif Tayyab formed NMG. It was a splintered JUP group comprised of those party leaders who did not agree to boycott the elections in 1985. In the 1985 elections this group won three seats in the National Assembly. (Riaz, 1988) Thereafter JUP leader Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani announced that all the members who left the JUP if they wanted to rejoin the party they would be welcomed. Together with members of many members of the National Assembly, Usman Khan Noori had returned to JUP. This is a step forward the group weakened. The group has joined the IJI in that situation. Being an integral part of the group's alliance received tickets for those seats of the National Assembly it had won in the 1985 elections but refused to contest JUP elections and withdrew all of its elections and alliance candidates as well.

## **Liberal Political Party**

One of IJI's member parties was the NPP, which called itself the political heir of the IJI, PPP and it was a liberal party having an economic agenda of equal distribution of sources. It joined the IJI among the common people due to its political differences with the leadership of the PPP and being a new party was not organised properly to win the elections. It became part of the alliance.

## **National People's Party (NPP)**

A breakup of a faction of PPP, Ghulam Mustufa Jatoi and NPP was formed in 1986. Khar deserted the PPP and joined the NPP. Hanif Ramay also supported NPP formation but was unable to work with Jatoi who left the party for considerable time and joined hands with the Fida league. S.M. Zafar (a former law minister), Kamal Azfar (a former minister and governor of Sindh), Syed Hamid Raza Gillani (leading Parliamentarian and speaker of the National Assembly), Pir Aftab Hussain Shah Jillani, Nasrullah Khattak, Begum Nargis Naeem, Mian Sajid Pervaiz, Ch. Mukhtar, Bashir Ahmad Bhutta, Makhdoom Hamiduddin, Sardar Ghous Bux Raisani (a former federal minister), Syed Umeed Ali Shah and Nafees Siddiqui were also a few of the prominent political leaders of the PPP who joined NPP along with powerful feudal lords from all four provinces. The underlying reason for NPP formation was a leadership conflict with Benazir Bhutto, and Nusrat. Jatoi was of the opinion that Z was a close lieutenant. A. Bhutto, he deserved to be the PPP leader. He was the federal minister, and CM Sindh, under Bhutto's leadership. He hasn't even left the party when it was faced with a difficult time from the ruling authority during the martial law regime in Zia. He was from considering that the PPP was an ideological party. Because of that difference of opinion with the he decided to form an independent party which was supposed to be the actual Bhutto family heir to the PPP and Bhutto ideology.

Another justification for that split was that of Benazir attitude to socialism, as it had decided to adopt a moderate economic system instead of pursuing socialism to draw more people to the PPP. Jatoi was elected by consensus as his first president. Hanif Ramay was appointed as first Party Secretary General, and S. M. Zafar became its chief organizer. The party's four Provincial Chiefs were Ghulam Mustafa Khar (Punjab), Pir Aftab Shah Jillani (Sindh), Sardar Ghaus Bux Raisani and Nasrullah Khattak (NWFP) (Baluch). The elected chief had to nominate office bearers, and then the party's general council endorsed Jatoi. Jatoi was a huge party critic of Zia-introduced democracy. He was of the opinion that the system was introduced only for prepare people to follow authoritative governor's

patterns. He criticized the Z. A. Bhutto family members for amending the Islamic socialism party programme to a moderate economic agenda. The PPP leadership had accepted Zia's terms and conditions which was not acceptable to Jatoi, either. He believed this was done only to achieve country premiership. The ones that criticised Sheik Rashid, Hanif Ramay and Khar. The decision by the PPP to accept the conditions lay down by Zia was refused membership of the party. Another issue was holding elections for party offices. The Bhutto family wanted people to be nominated but Jatoi wanted to hold the elections within the Party. When the suggestion was rejected, Jatoi requested recognition of the active party workers by nominating them for Party offices. He prepared a list for that purpose was denied but his suggestions and many of those nominated had during Martial Law, supported the national office holders. Jatoi disagreed that decision although he was appointed Sindh PPP Provincial Chairman Benazir and her supporters demanded that Pakistan became a confederation opposed to the actual PPP request. For Jatoi it was not acceptable to make Pakistan into a federation. Thereafter the leadership of the PPP left the idea of a confederation but was not properly publicised. Because those leaders who supported the idea of a Confederation were nominated to important offices. Jatoi was later terminated from the President's office in Sindh

PPP. Jatoi thought the PPP's main aim was to work for the sovereignty of Pakistan and saving its people from exploitation to turn it into a welfare state but a party leadership had ignored its real aims so it was imperative that he worked separately to attain the actual PPP agenda.

### **Fluctuating Contours of the Alliance**

The acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan announced this in the wake of Zia's death that elections are to be held on a date announced. The Supreme Court later granted its verdict to hold elections based on a party. Due to these decisions the political parties tried to increase their chances of victory in upcoming elections. In that specific scenario, efforts to forge political alliances with other parties in the National and Provincial Assemblies receive a majority. The outcome of IJI was that engagements. Nawaz Sharif tried to become the member and provincial president of a divided PML to strengthen his hold over the party to prepare for the forthcoming elections. Because it became weak from the division of PML into PML (F) and PML (J) and felt at its best interest in making an alliance with other political parties that it has had to work hard for. PML leadership contacted other parties, including Mohajir Qaumi Movement, to form a broader alliance and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, JUP. Serious engagement was made to win Noorani's support. Jatoi made the same sort of efforts in his meetings with Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Fida Muhammad, chair of one Muslim League faction, announced that he would seek the cooperation of like-minded parties in the fight against MRD, which according to him it worked against Pakistan's ideology. The vice president of PML (F) Asif Vardag also made it clear that his party was prepared to work with everybody opposed political party to PPP. His first success was the NPP's positive attitude and tilt to PML (ML (F) won the NPP of Jatoi. Having reached agreement on the Jatoi electoral alliance announced it had made an alliance to challenge the elections and safeguarding the country's future based on the idea of making Pakistan a welfare state. On that occasion Jatoi clearly announced he had no objection to PML (F) propagating Ziaism but committing its party to "strengthening national solidarity, guarding the territorial and ideological borders of Pakistan, and committing itself to bringing everything land laws in accordance with the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah. Jatoi also announced that the alliance would do everything possible making further alliances with other parties, even after the elections have been won. He was of the opinion that it was important to create mutual cooperation between the political parties. An environment of integrity and honesty, and leadership committed to ending country corruption, smuggling and narco-trafficking. Other executives the NPP had not been happy with such an alliance as Khar. He was not willing to cooperate with right wing political parties such as PML and NPP membership resigned. He established its own NPP faction named NPP (Khar Group).

This was the first step towards forging a broader alliance. Nawaz Sharif, Jatoi and Fida chatted with other party leaders like JI, JUI (Darkhwati) independently to reach a positive conclusion. PML (F)

Group), HJ, Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group), and parliamentary ex-opposition Group (IPG) on establishing a political alliance. The panel participants were Fida Muhammad (CM Punjab), Nawaz Sharif, Akhtar Qazi (CM Sindh), Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Mahmood A. Fazle Haq (CM NWFP), Federal Minister Naseem Ahmad Aaheer. Mir Afzal Khan, Haroon. Professor Ahmad Ghafoor, Professor Ahmad Khurshid Ch. JI Rehmat Ilahi. JUI (D): Maulana Sami, Maulana Ajmal Qadri, Bashir Ahmad Shad, defending Mian Arif. Dr. Sarfraz, of the NPP Ghulam Mustufa Jatoti The meeting featured Mir, Syed Zia Abbas, S. M. Zafar and Zafar Bakhtawari. Agha Murtaza Poya represented HJ, and Mian Fazle Haq represented JAH and Muhammad Yaqub Choudhary. Syed Fakhar Imam was in attendance represented by IPG. Aheer, the former minister of the interior, was instrumental in arranging the meeting. Jatoti stepped up the alliance and discussed the matter with Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Syed Fakhar Imam. There have been some efforts by the leadership also to form an alliance with JUP. Qazi Hussain Ahmad had thought it that there was a need for the time to establish an effective alliance at national level so that prosperity could be achieved in the context of Islamic Ideology that would Keeping it safe from all internal and external threats. Qazi Hussain Ahmad wanted religious alliance, but this did not materialize. JI also had some debates although they could not reach an agreement with the Junejo faction of the Muslim League. One of the best the reason for the failure was that Junejo attempted to reach an agreement with PPP. JI subsequently joined IJI, which based its manifesto on the Islamization of Pakistani law. It was decided to consult with smaller religious parties. Accordingly, Jatoti met Tehrik's head, Nifaz-e-Fiqae-Jaffaria.

Fiqae Jaffria was summoned to the Nizam-e-Islam Party, Shia Political party and a faction of the NDP also wanted to be a member of the IJI. Some of the leaders of the alliances were of the opinion that to strengthen the alliance in Sindh MQM should be included. To achieve this goal some efforts were made to create a dialogue with MQM but most of these efforts could not bring any positive results. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was made president after a promise with Baig that he would continue the policies of Zia. He also had to help preventing PPP from winning the open-majority elections. Ghulam Ishaq Khan in active collision with the Politised COAS Baig asked Gul to organise an effective right wing alliance against the seemingly bright prospect of Benazir Bhutto winning the 1988 general elections. It was important to unite to narrow prospects of PPP victory on one platform, Anti-PPP voters. For this Ghulam intended to make Ishaq Khan and Baig an alliance of anti-PPP parties for which Gul's services were sought. Hamid Gul, then the ISI chief became Brigadier Imtiaz's ally and worked to bridge differences between different political parties and to bring them at one forum. These efforts proved successful like some of the parties like JI who wanted to join PML-F but did have some it was joined by reservations with guidance and support from Gul. There is a debate that immediately after the Junejo Government's dismissal On 29 May 1988, Gul began to work on the formation of an IJI or a broader alliance of Right-wing political parties but this process has been postponed because JI had taken longer than waiting to join IJI. He also admitted that the formation of the alliance was delayed due to certain JI reservations. Had it agreed a little earlier, IJI's performance could be they were far superior in the 1988 elections? He also took on the support of establishment and ISI in alliance building process. He leveraged his influence convince certain politicians who have had close ties with Zia to take part in one platform. (Jan, 1988)

Gul himself accepted that he was working to ally the IJI, to counter Power of PPP and the preservation of the image of the army among the people as PPP. It was expected to distort him with an overwhelming majority after he came to power. The PPP has not only tried to reinforce its opponents but also to reverse the negative PPP character also became a topic of discussion. The Military top brass considered the formation of IJI necessary. In 1990 Benazir, while defending herself in the Supreme Court in answer to Ghulam Ishaq Khan during her term of office, the court told her that the authority concerned had told her that Gul's superior orders helped establish IJI. She claimed she had been told about these elections. It wouldn't have been held at all if the PPP had free reign. Her chamber discussed this that former air chief Zulfiqar Ali has asked Gul about his role in the political affairs of after Zia's death Pakistan. Gul said without denying anything 'Whatever I did, I was the execution of orders. (Hussain, 1988) Saeed Shafqat also touched on ISI's involvement in the IJI formation in its work the

Pakistan Political System and Public Policy. The only one hope for success in the 1988 election against the PPP was a full union of the right wing faction in Pakistani politics, the army, intelligence and caretaker of which the government has used every available source to form an alliance between the right wing political parties. Throughout the Zia era the army had portrayed the PPP as traitors. The process behind that was that to preserve a positive image of the army it's important to portray a negative PPP image. Gul, accompanied by Beg and Ghulam Ishaq Khan, formulated a strategy and brought various political parties to one forum named the Democratic Islamic Alliance. So it would appeal to the public at large.

Nawaz Sharif himself was later named Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). He admitted that the idea of an anti-PPP alliance between the various political parties was transmitted by Beg and Goul. He also accepted the fact that JI was unwilling to make a PML alliance and other parties but Gul played an important role in bringing JI closer to IJI. JI was not willing to join the alliance, as it was not offered enough election seats but PML wanted to ally at any cost so it accepted JI's dictate. JI had reservations<sup>326</sup> concerning joining any alliance. It gave a five item agenda and asked for its consent to join the alliance.

On 10 October 1988 JI joined the alliance. Decisions were taken following lengthy discussions between JI leaders such as Qazi Hussain Ahmad and professor IJI leadership comprising Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif, Pir Fazl, Aheer, Khurshid Ahmad, Maulana Sami and Abdul Qazi Lateef and other NPP heads at Dr. Sarfraz Mir's residence, Islamabad. Qazi Hussain Ahmad believed the alliance could be a better choice for long-term Jamaat Targets given the country's political instability. Nawaz Sharif said the JI support for IJI was unconditional as preconditions might make the alliance work difficult. It cannot be said that the alliance was made just because the army and the establishment was asking for it. The alliance member parties had their own personal reasons also to join the alliance, but it is true if the alliance was not formed it might not have been so easy, facilitated by the ISI, to form such a strong alliance prior to the 1988 General Elections. It is generally said that ISI was also instrumental in unifying PML-F and PML-J. In the 1988 general elections the ISI persuaded Muhammad Khan Junejo to leave the alliance only two days before the last date, of his party with TI and Jamial-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan To file election nomination papers, and join the IJI.

Gul later claimed he is the 1988 elections were responsible for its success. Brigadier Imtiaz, Extra Director General of the ISI, and Major Aamir, Officer of the ISI and Incharge Section In 1988 Islamabad helped Gul to form an anti-PPP alliance. Beg contacted PML leaders Jatoi, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Maulana Sami, Fakhra Imam and Poya to inform them that elections can only be held on time if there are chances of a PPP victory minimized and achievable only through an anti-PPP alliance. Hasan Askari Rizvi commented the parties made the alliance without it considering the long term costs that had to be paid. Brigadier Imtiaz has said IJI has been formed by ISI. He said he met personally with MQM leader Altaf Hussain to persuade him to join the IJI but refused to agree with the suggestion. He also said that to fund IJI advertising campaign a committee composed of Aheer of PML and a member was given 15 million rupees by JI. He has specified that a justification for the money spent after the elections Vouchers would be filed for each and every rupee and the remaining money would be coming back.

He also informed everyone that the Presidency provided this money. Senate chairman Farooq H. Naik told Qayyum Nizami that two billion rupees had been spent at the time of IJI formation retired from Habib Bank Ltd. Brigadier Imtiaz agreed that to avoid the PPP winning an overwhelming majority of agencies played a role in history. After PML unification there were two options to join PAI or IJI they were able to unite the two alliances. JI and TI had national policy conflicts about The Afghanistan issue and JI had previously gained approval of its position on Afghanistan under the IJI. At the same time, IJI could not take the risk of losing JI because it was the most frequent important political religious party. Because of JI support IJI was stronger than PAI, NPP, JUI -D and group Lakhvi. Taking into account the whole situation it was in the best possible way PML's interest in maintaining its link to IJI as compared with PAI. It was hard too for the NPP and JI to continue under Junejo's leadership. From PAI, JUP and TIP at Noorani unable to work with a league dominated by CMs whose

dismissal was requesting. The decision by Junejo to reunite ML was unacceptable to other members of ML That PAI. Thus Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and JUP have decided to stay away from the alliance. IJI also tried to attract MRD member parties, but they still opposed the PPP the offer was rejected. Junejo told the people there were differences among the IJI member parties but this was inevitable in the political sphere. He said he accepted the the IJI's seven-point agenda, and on that basis it joined IJI. It was said in the 1990 elections by an eminent member of the IJI regarding the issue of next PM: If the IJI succeeds in winning the elections, "those who brought us together will Even this muddle is sorted out." Besides the efforts of the ISI and the Chief of the Army, that was the Anti-PPP attitude of some political parties, which was the main reason for establishing an alliance Under the IJI Banner.<sup>347</sup> PML (F) preferred to counter Junejo an alliance with Jatoi And, in Sindh, Benazir. Many politicians supported it, because it enjoyed patronage of those in authority.

Most of the people thought the IJI were a command performance but that can not be accepted as the whole truth. There is some grounds for such a declaration. First, all the parties that joined the alliance had their own reasons for joining Join in. Secondly, Brigadier Imtiaz said he was trying to cod Altaf Hussain but Altaf did not approve of his idea of joining the alliance. Makhdoom Javed Hashmi said that while ISI played a part in alliance formation in particular Bringing different political parties to one platform but not interfering with the internal one Alliance matters and decisions were made by members of the Alliance. This shows that ISI or any other institution or agency did not force it to join the alliance. Was MQM interested in Sindh politics, and sought victory in Karachi and Hyderabad particularly and generally in Sindh. They were more interested in Sindh's politics and he wanted to be able to manipulate Sindh politics for which he would join the the IJI could hardly have had a powerful impact. So joining the alliance wasn't seen as wise. Another factor was that PML (F) and NPP had already entered into an agreement, and were to also contact other parties. Finally, it is not deniable that the ISI or the army had a role in establishing IJI.

### **IJI Manifesto**

PML (F), JI, NPP, JUI (D), JAH (Lakhvi), JMP, Jihad Hizb-e and independent Syed Fakhar Imam political party decided on a few issues to collaborate with each of them another one under the IJI flag. Those things were

- Islamic Laws Dominance in the world,
- Allowing for all relevant employment growth on a fair playing field society divisions include merchants, employers, farmers and students arrangements to ensure their interests are safeguarded.,
- To provide low-cost justice for every person without discriminating against the color base, race basis or sex basis.,
- Protecting Women's Rights,
- Supporting Afghan Jihad entirely,
- Advancement of the use of the Nuclear Technology to promote the nation,
- A non-aligned foreign policy which might help an independence movement for the Palestinian and Kashmir people, and ensure cooperation with the countries in a Third Nation. (Rajpoot, 2005)

In truth, these targets were chosen as a standard strategy for PML (F) and NPP but Both of these groups is willing to invite all groups to adhere to these points a larger coalition will be easier to shape. The manifold was endorsed by eight political party's and the IJI officially acceded. These were the fundamental points which should provide the Bottom line for law. Key issues were also discussed in the Coalition manifesto is laid out in the Annex. The IJI manifesto was revised in advance of the elections 1990 but it indicated barely any significant improvements. The Manifesto at the same time the committee had to prevent any plans which contradicted the seven basic political points IJI policy.

### **Organizational Structure of IJI**

The IJI is widely thought to have performed extremely well. Though the facts have proven it not lived up to his name. Second, it was entered only by those parties which had at least some nice for it. MQM declined to join the IJI because it did not think it would represent its activity.

The coalition was blamed for not framing a constitution for its functioning. Not much interest has even been paid to his organisation. Only a couple of commissions and subcommittees were set up but were

not set up at the time of the creation of the coalition. These committees were formed periodically to address the challenges faced via the coalition. Underneath is a simple hierarchical structure: The first Secretary General was assigned to Professor Ghafoor Ahmad. This department he was left to JI's discretion to appoint Professor Ghafoor for this office. The Professor Ghafoor held office until 1992, when JI left the coalition. Jatoi used to be first IJI convener and Nawaz Sharif flourished. As formation occurs it was agreed from this coalition that

the president will be chosen for a term of three months in alphabetic order while voting Nawaz Sharif on 11 February 1989 president for a year in lieu of Maulana Sami. This was done on the recommendations of the Maulana Sami, thinking the country's circumstances deserved a good and more common coalition leader. Nawaz Sharif approved his idea, and the decision it was overwhelming. Maulana Sami has been named Vice-President and Nominated to the rank of Assistant Secretary General. Agha Murtaza Poya became Alliance Media President. All these consultations take place over a period of a year. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad must continue as Alliance Secretary-General for corresponding year. The announcement was taken at the IJI central council meeting heads of the alliance's eight national states along with others attended Members of IJI. There were also a few committees formed to support the cause of IJI.

- A three-member committee composed of Asif Vardag and Maulana as convener as members Fidaur Rehman Darkhwasti and Liaquat Baluch. The committee had to visit both of the provinces planning the IJI. The committee was expected to present its report in latest IJI central council conference.

- A Law Committee was also formed to safeguard IJI from the legal complications The PPP's are developed. S.M. Zafar has been elected as its Director Comitee. MNA Abdul Gahfoor Chaudhry Chaudhry Muhammad Ashraf, and the vice president of the Punjab Bar Board, Raja Haq Nawaz, was a member of this comitee.

- The IJI Central Committee has also appointed a Legislative Commission under Ghulam Mustufa Jatoi. Ghulam became members of the committee Hyder Wyen, S.M. Zafar, Prof. Khursheed Ahmad, Senator Mulana Sami Hussain Bungalzai and Shujjat Hussain, from Choudhary. This body had to determine the IJI constitution to determine whether any of the clauses needed revision.

- A 21 member commission to supervise the election process of the IJI Was made. Those lawmakers who did not wish to attend this group to challenge every federal election. IJI's central council has agreed to create IJI Headquarters in Islamabad. There was another office built in the House of the Punjab Muslim League.

### **Other Contemporary Alliances**

Many minor parties have formed alliances after the IJI. A five party Alliance was established prior to the 1988 elections. The PML Zuhari Party, Pakistan included that Muslim Mohaaz, Tehreek-i-Taameer-i-Pakistan, Independent Wing of Pakistan, and Jeevay part Pakistan. The partnership was called Jamhoori Ittehad of Pakistan Qaumi. Neither of its member parties have played some kind of important role in Pakistan's politics so that it cannot drawing people's interest at the mass stage. The war, part of which is it has three distinct intimate, ideological and regional characteristics of our politics. In the material the post-military hegemonic structure is the Bhutto and anti-Bhutto trend that lasted until 1999, when Musharraf took over.

Political parties and alliances are an important aspect of Pakistani politics. It was IJI one of Pakistan's influential political alliances that participated in the 1988 elections followed by various political parties and alliances. The 1988 campaign was one of the fairer elections in Pakistan's history, in which PPP was victorious center and IJI had been a champion in the province of Punjab. These elections marked the future Pakistan's past, and the leadership emerging on the national scenario 1988 elections continue to be influential in Pakistan's national politics.

### **Conclusion**

The formation of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) in the late 1980s illustrates how Pakistan's political landscape has historically been shaped by fragmented party structures, ideological diversification, and

the strategic intervention of state institutions. The coalition brought together religious parties, conservative factions, and breakaway groups that shared a common objective of countering the Pakistan Peoples Party in the post-Zia period. Despite its ideological inconsistencies and conflicting leadership interests, the IJI succeeded in consolidating the right-wing vote bank and significantly influenced the electoral outcomes of 1988 and 1990. The alliance not only facilitated the political rise of Nawaz Sharif but also reshaped patterns of opposition politics by demonstrating how temporary coalitions can operate as instruments of political engineering. Ultimately, the IJI experience highlights the recurring trend in Pakistan where alliances are formed as short-term strategic responses to political uncertainty and institutional imbalance. While such coalitions may lack long-term cohesion, they leave a lasting imprint on democratic processes, civil–military relations, and the overall trajectory of party politics in the country.

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