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Legal Practice and Digitalization

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Abstract
The legal community broadly recognizes that it must respond to the continuing digitalization of the legal market and to the evolving processes of legal service production. Such responsiveness will, in turn, require an analogous transformation of legal education so that curricula and pedagogies become congruent with the profession's impending evolution. The pressing empirical question is thus how the profession will enact this digital adaptation. This article nominates and elaborates three prospective trajectories that the legal profession might plausibly pursue. Each is grounded in contemporaneous sociological models of the profession's structural dynamics and the legal market's evolution, supplemented by diachronous accounts of the profession's development over the last century. To ground these theoretical projections, the analysis will restrict itself to three comparable parliamentary democracies Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands linked by sufficient legal, cultural, and institutional similarities. The three proposed trajectories are characterized as non-mutually exclusive, permitting simultaneous or sequential pursuit within the profession. We will subsequently address our principal inquiry: in what manner must legal education evolve in order to respond to the digitalisation of the legal profession? In pursuit of this objective, we will delineate three prospective reforms in legal education, each aligned with distinct trajectories the profession may adopt in adjusting to the digitalisation of its marketplace and the generation of its primary output.

Keywords
legal profession, legal education, technology, automation, digitalisation

Introduction

(The Risk of De-professionalization through Automation of Legal Services)

The ongoing automation of legally decisive processes especially the evaluation of facts followed by subsumption and the identification of applicable law through the generation of legal opinions and policy assessments constitutes a continuous and expansive trend. Legal markets have signalled that such automation represents a fundamental, pressing challenge, both because the value that clients attach to traditional legal analysis is diminishing and because law corporations increasingly seek lower-cost, software-based alternatives. The implications for legal education are, therefore, both

urgent and complex. In particular, faculties must identify the adjusted competencies that future lawyers must possess to thrive in a digitised environment. This identification presupposes the preliminary task of anticipating the essential activities that tomorrow's practitioners will be expected to perform. For the present discussion, we advance three converging, non-exclusive hypotheses that probe the prospective evolution of the legal profession and the attendant competencies that legal curricula must cultivate.The pathways that we present draw upon discernible movements currently observable within the legal field, movements that digitalisation is poised to amplify and hasten. Each pathway has been chosen for its consonance with the possible directions that digitalisation may induce within the market and the profession, as analysed through sociological models that elucidate the dynamic interaction of context, technology, and professional habitus. In light of the three pathways, we propose corresponding transformations in legal education designed to equip tomorrow's graduates for seamless integration into a profession that will be increasingly shaped by digital infrastructures.

- The first pathway foregrounds the continuing consolidation of legal information technology as a distinct and rapidly accumulating job cluster, a continuity whose eventual contours and scale remain in some respects open to sociotechnical uncertainty.
- The subsequent pathways interrogate two established domains, alternative dispute resolution and public administration whose salience will be amplified to the degree that the profession undergirds a collective commitment to the enhancement of social cohesion.

The durability of both pathways also turns upon the degree to which the legal profession retains regulatory jurisdiction over these sectors, in which it encounters cross-professional competition for mandate and legitimacy.

The three identified pathways share one overarching conceptual thread: trust. This encompasses belief in fully automated legal services understood in the broadest sense (the first pathway); confidence in the rule of law and its institutional guardians (the third pathway); and the layered trust micro, meso, and macro across societies and in the transnational sphere that compensates for the inevitable reduction of the human dimension when legal services become fully automated (the second pathway). Although the demand for digitalisation seems, on the surface, to predicate trust, its presence in the pathways also elucidates why fundamental societal mechanisms to create and sustain trust have crystallised in the specified formats: entrusting legal professionals with the guardianship of the rule of law and cultivating, through the second pathway, a conflict-resolution modality that retains a human-centred orientation, namely alternative dispute resolution.

Significant attention has been directed to the horizontal competition arising between the legal profession and adjacent fields, particularly regarding the interactions between lawyers and economists.3 While the rise of automation stands to reconfigure the nature of tasks performed by legal practitioners, such developments do not, by themselves, enable non-lawyers to execute legal functions autonomously and without oversight from qualified lawyers. For this reason, we shall set aside the horizontal competition with non-legal specialists. Our analysis will instead concentrate on the anticipated transformations in legal tasks driven by automation, and on the consequent adjustments required within legal education to remain aligned with the evolving market. Accordingly, we will examine how the intensification of automated legal labour fortifies the internal vertical competition among lawyers and how this, in turn, raises the competency thresholds expected of legal professionals.

This analysis begins from the hypothesis that the automation of legal work could liberate clients from dependence on the legal profession. To preserve its authority in such a scenario, the profession must pursue two strategies: firstly, securing ownership of the technologies that deliver automated legal services, and secondly, cultivating a demand for a distinctive, irreplaceable human contribution in legal practice. The second strategy highlights a critical variable in the potential evolution of the profession amid ongoing digitalisation: irrespective of the technical feasibility of automating legal

work, the degree of market acceptance and financial viability of automated services will ultimately hinge on the trust clients place in them, whether they operate with partial or full automation. In this light, trust will be examined as a pivotal currency in a digitised legal landscape, correlated with specific transformation trajectories. The subsequent subsections will then investigate how the perception of legal work among laypersons is likely to be reshaped by automation, and will outline the essential features that may render certain dimensions of legal work resistant to automation.

Pathway and Transformation One: Automated Jurisprudence

Even the best technology for delivering legal services can't succeed unless clients believe the results are trustworthy. To win that confidence, automated legal services must deliver the same level of legal certainty that a traditional lawyer provides. This means that the software must rely on information that is accurate, thorough, and kept up-to-date in real time. The base of that information has to come from lawyers who deeply understand the law and how to interpret it. To stay relevant, these legal experts no longer manually run every step of the process; instead, their job is to refine, sharpen, and oversee the rules that the programs follow. Another core requirement is that we clearly separate cookie-cutter legal tasks like generating a standard contract from the next-level legal challenges. Those challenges include solving open-ended legal questions, applying old laws in brand-new situations, or untangling contradictory rules. If we get the first layer to run perfectly, we help ensure that clients have a foundation of confidence to tackle the deeper, messier questions the law inevitably faces. Maintaining that level of reliability also points to a much bigger conversation about how we govern legal technologies at scale, which we'll touch on in Pathway Three.

Pathway One: Regulation and Coding of Legal Technology

When we look at how the legal industry really works, we see that a different kind of player is joining the scene: legal tech startups. Their rapid growth is starting to squeeze solo practitioners and tiny law firms, who once had a near monopoly on trust and local knowledge. Because startups can often deliver the same legal services faster, cheaper, and with clearer billing, the older guard is quietly being pushed to the edges. These solo and micro-firm practitioners are not just any lawyers; they are the last representatives of a once-closed aristocracy, a small, interlinked group that successfully passed legal know-how down the generations like a family heirloom. Their family law practices served, in effect, as the family factory.

This approach has drifted to the edge of the legal market, pushed aside by Big Law, which has turned itself into a ladder for lawyers who want to climb the hierarchy. The next wave of disruption may come from legal tech. Those emerging platforms will gradually absorb the small firm and solo practitioner market. They will not replace the lawyers; rather, they will commodify their work, making it cheaper and less secure. More price transparency lowers fees, and algorithmic filters secure the tech brickwall against clients seeking direct access to the legal system.

Professional self-protection will need to focus on regulation of legal tech itself: the platforms, their builders, and the trainers who teach their users. The strategy has three limbs. First, a licensing scheme must cover all forms of legal software. Second, both the developers and, where feasible, the end users must hold documented qualifications. Lastly, control must extend to the instructors of the trainers, which means the universities and professional schools must design legally mandated curricula. Without such perimeter walls, the next fast-maturing startups could operate with a skeleton legal team and still outpace traditional firms, to the profession's long-term peril.

Transformation One: Jurisprudence as Applied Study of Technology and Society

To keep pace with the pace of legal-tech evolution, law schools must graduate professionals who build and use these tools with confidence. Options include hybrid "T-shaped" lawyers who master

foundational legal, ethical, and technical nuances, and technical roles such as lawyer-linguists who understand statutory language, legal narrative, and regulatory texts well enough to fine-tune machine-readability. Yet, drag anchors still afflict the system. For instance, the Danish Bar insists on a rigid "one profession fits all" model, resisting any opt-out specialisation. To leverage this resistance at the outset, a streamlined, integrated curriculum of "Law and IT" thrives. Perpetually bolting on law and IT credits to two compartmental tracks results in a Frankenstein education of minimal use. Instead, the first, core semester must centre on core jurisprudence and on a coherent toolkit of distributed, embedded, and civic tech. The second semester then defers concurrently taught property, contracts, and procedure so that syntax, semantics, syntax, and active semantics loop back through law and society in the scaffold of an immersive, proactive, generative environment.

Only in this way can automated and digital jurisprudence stabilize as an applied experimental science. Explicitly translational, this frame reframes jurisprudence as the contingent inquiry into the constructive intermediaries algorithms, interfaces, and platforms each citizen and each regulatory institution deploys to orchestrate the networks of obligation, trust, and accountability that constitute society. The curriculum thus collects from established science and technology studies the participative pragmatism of innovation scholars, the reflexivity of legal inquiry, and the civic mission of participatory informatics.

This first pathway shows the need for lawyers to get serious about building strong IT skills. We're already seeing the start of this in legal start-ups, where the gap between law and technology is narrowing fast. It means lawyers can no longer afford to pick up tech knowledge on the side; they must train formally and keep training. Better training will help the legal field regain some leverage over tech. Since the bar is lowering for tech entrepreneurs to offer legal counsel, lawyers must remember they're not the only ones in the courtroom anymore code is the new case law, and programmers are often on the other side of the table.

Pathway and Transformation Two: The Irreducible Human Element

With legal services trending toward greater automation, the margins for the human element that machines cannot, or should not, fulfill are tightening. Clients will inevitably turn toward the parts of the process they still feel only a human can credibly manage. That fraction of legal work inevitably tied to human oversight does not consist of repetitive drafting or simple calculations; it draws on an art that machines cannot imitate. Most plainly, that art is the ability of a lawyer to internalize and genuinely feel the emotional pressures a client is navigating.

The arena where this art is performed most visibly, and to the greatest adaptive challenge for all peers, is alternative dispute resolution (ADR). In that context, an advocate does not merely recite the law but wraps a surrogate understanding around the client's fear, injury, or desire. If the necessity of watching the client's expressive reaction to a mediating party becomes apparent to the representative, the process survives only because the human presence is there to monitor and to respond. Now consider the almost identical horizon that exists elsewhere in the legal world: in every transactional meeting, in every courtroom presentment, and in every drafting where equivocal loyalty is to be negotiated. If our observations of the irreducible human task in ADR continue to hold, we are faced with a short but vital extrapolation: toward any legal work where the lawyer must stand, and see, and feel, while a client lays their proxy case before a stranger.

Pathway Two: Expanding the Potential of ADR

Digital tools are reshaping how lawyers deliver routine legal services, pushing some from the market. Yet, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) could become a stronghold for those ready to adapt. Attorneys who master mediation and negotiation gain two important advantages: they can launch new service lines that broaden their client base and enhance the quality of their existing legal

offerings.

As more complex legal functions shift to paralegals within public agencies, embedding ADR into legal training strengthens the entire profession. The University of Copenhagen, for instance, recently launched a master's track designed for paralegals with vocational bachelor's credentials. This fast-moving program already seeks to position its graduates to handle responsibilities traditionally reserved for lawyers, particularly in public administration. By weaving mediation into core curricula, legal educators not only safeguard the public legal sector's standing as paralegals gain ground, but they also fortify the position of lawyers in small and mid-sized firms that face ever-accelerating digitalisation. These practices can arrest the growing market might of larger firms, whose technological advantage remains more pronounced when the practice remains transactional and documentation-based.

Right now, clients stick with this type of law firm because those firms deliver their services directly there's no middleman to complicate things. Once the legal tasks these firms handle can be fully automated, the smaller and midsize firms will have to convince clients to keep coming back by pointing out the "artistic" or "quirky" parts of their work, insisting that an app will never deliver that. Although alternative dispute resolution (ADR) keeps growing, we still haven't tapped into its entire value across different legal areas. Demand for the old-style legal services keeps fading, and that trend will keep nudging more lawyers to focus on mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and conflict avoidance. On top of that, tech now allows ADR to work for cases where the parties are continents apart, making it possible to settle things online (we call that Online Dispute Resolution, or ODR). The digital wave keeps stretching ADR even further.

Incorporating mediation more thoroughly into legal education requires us to move beyond standalone mediation courses that teach techniques and to embed mediative competencies into every field of law. This reframing positions communication as a core legal skill rather than an ancillary one. To justify their value against automated systems, lawyers must perceive the unique, nuanced dimensions of each case they mediate and leverage their mediative abilities to navigate those dimensions. Thus, the immediate focus must remain on conflicts at the micro-level, where individual perceptions and subtleties arise. Mastery at this micro scale then enables lawyers to graduate to meso- and macro-level mediation, where they manage disputes within and between organisations, across institutional frameworks, and on the global stage contributing to the resolution of complex, interconnected issues such as climate adaptation and migration governance.

The interplay of competencies directed toward interpersonal relations and formidable societal problems mandates a cohesive intellectual orientation. This orientation may be realised by reshaping legal practice along lines suggested by the applied arts and humanities, echoing Martha Nussbaum's Human Development model. Within such a framework, a legal graduate must cultivate, for example, a deeply empathic grasp of the manifold biographies and social realities that compose any given democratic polity. This sensitisation enables a balanced, yet critical, appraisal of legislative intentions and fosters an appreciation of the complex social subsystems that interact within a globally interdependent milieu.51

Essential competencies for any practitioner would therefore encompass mediation, rhetorical agility, and communicative dexterity across a wide spectrum of arenas. In addition, the future lawyer must actively embrace multivocality, an openness to the indeterminate, and a critical stance toward the ambiguities intrinsic to the human predicament. This conception of professional training has already aided humanities graduates in securing influential roles within Danish municipal governance.52 Within the prevailing law curricula, mediation and legal rhetoric figure as elective strands, though their depth and uptake remain variable.

Courses in legal philosophy and legal sociology cultivate multiperspectivity by probing how varying notions of scientific truth and differing social and political power relations influence collective understandings of what constitutes applicable, appropriate, or ideally desirable law. Such inquiry,

however, requires more than the transmission of legal interpretation and application as a neutral, technical competence, an exercise that might yield uniform outcomes if practised with sufficient precision. Rather, the exercise is framed as a social project whose ultimate aim is to serve and transform the society that constitutes the law.

Given that textual interpretation, argumentation, and communication are already foundational to jurisprudence, a programme of reform need not regard a shift in legal education toward these competencies as insurmountable. It will, however, demand that instructors embed them in each legal branch without sacrificial loss to doctrinal rigour. Contemporary didactic theory holds that the acquisition of these practices germinates more robustly when they are integrated with the statutory and case material that students will encounter in the curriculum, as opposed to being relegated to separate 'soft skills' modules devoted, for instance, to rhetorical strategising or to neo sociological survey.53

In concise summary, the second route reformal rates legal education such that mediation as a professional service acquires heightened value in the legal labour market,54 thereby quickening a pattern now observable for several decades.

Data recently indicate that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is extending its reach, creating competition between attorneys and dedicated mediators.58 The attractiveness of ADR lies chiefly in its cost efficiency, rapid resolution, and accessibility across diverse legal contexts.59 Mediation may be conducted by both law-trained and non-law-trained individuals, because core competencies centre on dialogue facilitation, social cognition, and behavioral insight rather than explicit legal knowledge. Nevertheless, a growing cohort of attorneys is acquiring expertise in conflict dynamics and management.60 This expertise, paired with a thorough understanding of procedural law, empowers them to identify precisely where and how to complement or recalibrate conventional legal structures. The potential of ADR remains largely untapped, leaving a considerable opening for legal practitioners to widen its market share.61

Pathway and Transformation Three: Digitalised Virtue

The automation of legal decision-making will introduce opacity, since contemporary machine-learning algorithms yield results without generating interpretable rationale that relates to legal norms and principles. Assessment is thus limited to comparing outcomes against the training data, which is the sole 'gold standard' for determining validity.59 The consequent lack of transparency threatens public confidence in the rule of law, because the reasoning that produces a decision cannot be conveyed to litigants; only the outcome becomes visible.60 Restoring and maintaining that confidence will therefore demand that the operational steps and substantive results of legal technology be comprehensible and publicly validated.61

The gravity of this challenge is illustrated by the ongoing 'tele-data case' in Denmark. Over 3,000 criminal prosecutions involving a predicted custodial term exceeding six years relied on data that had been processed without adequate verification, leading to wrongful conclusions about culpability.62 The Danish Minister of Justice publicly underscored the systemic implications, declaring that the episode jeopardises the foundation of trust upon which the legal system rests.63

Although this case illustrates a specific failure in the automation of legal work, its wider import lies in the opacity of automated legal processes, a concern reflected in the Justice Minister's comment that he expects all errors to be exposed and resolved in a transparent and rigorous manner. Simultaneously, Denmark is pursuing a more transparent approach to the automation of public administration, mandating in future legislative proposals that case management, including administrative adjudications, be conducted by automated systems. Such initiatives, together with the challenge of securing public trust, highlight the imperative to justify automated decisions to the citizens affected by them and to the legal profession. This dual necessity calls for lawyers to grasp

the dynamic relationship between technological systems and the social environments in which they operate.

Pathway Three: Revitalisation of Legal Professionals as Guardians of the Rule of Law

Professional groups typically have a small set of strategic options for enhancing the worth of their central product.67 One such strategy is the deliberate cultivation of demand for that product. In the legal sector, this may be accomplished through legislative reforms, yet demand can also be stimulated on a more abstract level by constructing an argument for the necessity of regulation and by appealing to the collective inclination to observe such regulation. The current renaissance of the post-war vision of lawyers as custodians of the rule of law68 offers a particularly potent narrative: when the rule of law is framed as a critical civic asset, the discourse gains immediacy and traction. This narrative is consistent with the profession's functionalist self-representation,69 which portrays lawyers as the society's rational, stabilising agents who reshape social discord into manageable legal issues.70 Despite the unmistakable and growing pressures on the rule of law, particularly the populist movements that have surfaced across Europe,71 the continued emphasis on this functionalist portrayal, while contestable, fortifies the perceived utility and thereby the market value of legal services.

To underscore the lawyer's function as the Rechtsstaat's custodian guarding social cohesion and stability is effectively to underscore the worth of legal services. It is critical to appreciate that such value-generation does not demand that a large segment of the profession engage directly with the administration of the state or with public agencies. When the legal profession projects the image of a unified body, every practitioner benefits from an expanded worth ascribed to legal services: the consumer's trust in the legal product is heightened, since lawyers are viewed as the best-qualified guardians of social cohesion and stability. Furthermore, the profession's perceived homogeneity leads clients to regard the competence of its members as relatively uniform, and they therefore ascribe high worth to their services, confident that the ensemble of practitioners, on the whole, possesses the requisite expertise to safeguard the social order.

Within the recent evolution of the legal profession, the archetype of the lawyer-statesman has ceded prominence to the interdisciplinary corporate lawyer. The rehabilitation of lawyers as protectors of the rule of law, therefore, leans upon the notion of law as an autonomous, rational discipline propagated by legal positivism. Legal education must resist the temptation to endorse this intellectual posture, which remains largely confined to the cloisters of legal scholarship. Functionalist analyses have demonstrated that the profession perpetuates this narrative only to justify its monopoly over the legal market by presenting legal tasks as predicated on proprietary, esoteric expertise, rigid conventions, and empirically unverifiable claims of objectivity.

This conservative formulation of professional obligation, however, collapse under the weight of practice. A more expansive conception is requisite, one that interweaves the classical vision of lawyers as civic leaders with the contemporary, interdisciplinary, and yet fundamentally civic-minded orientation of cause lawyers. Cause lawyering represents one of the more inventive trajectories by which the profession seeks to transcend the narrow self-interest associated with corporate practice, thereby reformulating its identity in more publicly spirited terms.

Nevertheless, this perspective leaves intact the prevailing public impression of attorneys on both the state and citizen sides, and it deliberately refrains from portraying them as general agents of the community. Instead, the conception confines itself to members who advocate tirelessly on behalf of the organizations to which the dispute is deemed germane. If, however, the profession reasserts itself as custodian of secular conscience, it becomes imperative to specify the competencies required, and to indicate the curricular and pedagogical adjustments law faculties must undertake to equip future practitioners for the vocation of cohesive and inclusive jurisprudential leadership.

Third Transformation: Jurisprudence Reconceived as an Instrument for the Strengthening of Social Cohesion.

The competencies lawyers must cultivate to uphold secular values overlap significantly with the knowledge and skills the profession advertises as its hallmark: first, a solid doctrinal grasp of legal rules; second, the ability to communicate legal concepts clearly to specialist and non-specialist audiences alike; and, third, a nuanced appreciation of human conflicts and the people involved. The first of these competencies receives systematic attention in law school curricula. By contrast, the second and third encompassing a constellation of communicative and interpersonal skills tend to be developed in practice. Such learning typically occurs in lower-stakes environments such as summer placements and student assistantships, and more formally during the practical stages of legal education, including, depending on the jurisdiction, the second state exam or the probationary legal training for future barristers or for judges.

Legal education must impart more than doctrinal mastery; it must cultivate the ability to translate that mastery into responsible practice. If educators intend for a wider segment of the legal profession to serve effectively as custodians of the rule of law, they cannot rely solely on serendipitous learning during initial posts. Recent research on the US and UK professions reveals a vacuum in readiness and urges a more systematic embedding of ethical and civic virtues within curricula. The Danish context features government reviews, media commentary, and journalistic inquiries converging on the same deficiency, while the Netherlands has advanced the conversation further by explicitly mapping the implications for instructional design. The question then arises: what can structured education deliver that the practice environment, however rich in experience, cannot furnish alone?

One avenue is the systematic study of the profession's ethical codes, framing them not as prescriptive lists to be memorized but as foundational texts for critical dialogue and reflective practice.

Legal scholars regard these courses as broadly beneficial for law students, albeit insufficient for equipping them to confront the moral dilemmas that arise in practice. Accordingly, practitioners advocate for the integration of legal clinics as a complementary pedagogical measure. Moreover, ethics instruction framed explicitly around the routines and quandaries that lawyers routinely face can help students extract greater pedagogical value from the experiential learning that occurs in clinics, internships, and other field placements. Such a framework cultivates a reflexive orientation that augments the impact of the practical skills acquired throughout the curriculum.

In closing the analysis of the trilogy of pathways, and the related reformulation of legal education, it marks the necessity for a renewal of the conception of lawyers as modern statesmen, a conception steadily reinforced across recent European post-war decades and now returned, in prominence, to the major political rhetoric concerning the rule of law.87 Restored perception along these lines acts to neutralise two principal dangers to the profession's intellectual and social esteem: first, the persistent identification between lawyers and the social disorder as projected by certain of their clients;88 and second, the diminishing credibility of the profession's traditional functionalist defence, which had consistently presented the lawyer as a primary architect of social cohesion.89

In Denmark and Germany the recent public administration literature records a conspicuous sequence of episodes in which civil servants and elected representatives have, with marked originality, reinterpreted the legislative text, occasionally contravened it outright, and arrived at decisions dictated by political calculation rather than legal reasoning.90 These accumulative cases raise the possibility that the rule of law, as a constraining force upon administrative discretion, may have yielded in practice, and suggest that a conceivable avenue for reinvigorating the democratic character of administrative agencies lies in the cultivation within the civil service of a more robust ethical commitment to the rule of law, rather than the more conventional recourse to formal legislative remedy.91

Even though the present uncertainty surrounding the principle of the rule of law pertains first to lawyers in public service, it nevertheless impugns the legitimacy of the legal profession as a whole whenever that subset of legal actors forsakes its fidelity to the standards of hermeneutics and adjudication that, among the legal community, can most credibly be asserted to serve the common good rather than personal advantage. In addition, the profession has long striven to present itself as a unitary body in which all categories of legal actors are presumed to share a common stock of competencies and underlying values.

Conclusion

The response to the central question posed in the introduction 'What will be the principal tasks of future legal practitioners, for which law schools must prepare their students?'emerged in the course of our analysis through three discernible trends, and accordingly presents three prospective answers. Tomorrow's lawyers will bear the responsibility of restoring and sustaining the public's confidence in the legal system while preserving the human dimension of legal practice. They will achieve this by acquiring a sophisticated understanding of how technology is currently employed and how it is capable of shaping societal regulation in the future (transformation one). As routine legal tasks become automated, the profession will face a parallel rise in demands for competencies that address the plurality, indeterminacy, and ambiguities inherent in social conflicts. Lawyers will be expected to help resolve these conflicts through traditional litigation, alternative dispute resolution, and transdisciplinary approaches, with particular emphasis on the public sector (transformation two). Evaluating such multifaceted social problems and articulating the legal response to them will require legal professionals to engage in clear, solution-oriented dialogue with non-lawyers (transformations two and three). Simultaneously, the profession will be called upon to manifest its ethical principles and vocational virtues (transformation three). We propose that these expectations will weigh heaviest upon legal practitioners serving as public officials, while also acknowledging the significant, albeit different, visibility of cause lawyers within the private sector.

Legal education should undoubtedly equip students with the competencies necessitated by evolving market conditions by embedding legal technology and transdisciplinary inquiry into the curriculum. However, law schools should not postpone intervention until those conditions become acute. They can, and should, proactively shape the trajectory of market evolution by cultivating graduates prepared to advance it. Programs blending law with legal information technology, alongside transdisciplinary legal studies, can coexist with strengthened strands of transdisciplinary problem solving and governance within more conventional curricula. Such integrated approaches can encourage the profession to undergo more substantive adaptation than the piecemeal responses that merely soothe immediate employer dissatisfaction and risk fostering overly reactive curriculum adjustments.

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